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Abstract
The United Kingdom has placed itself on a transition towards a low-carbon economy and society, through the imposition
of a legally-binding goal aimed at reducing its ‘greenhouse gas’ emissions by 80% by 2050 against a 1990 baseline. A set of
three low-carbon, socio-technical transition pathways were developed and analysed via an innovative collaboration
between engineers, social scientists and policy analysts. The pathways focus on the power sector, including the potential
for increasing use of low-carbon electricity for heating and transport, within the context of critical European Union
developments and policies. Their development started from narrative storylines regarding different governance framings,
drawing on interviews and workshops with stakeholders and analysis of historical analogies. The quantified UK pathways
were named Market Rules, Central Co-ordination and Thousand Flowers; each reflecting a dominant logic of governance
arrangements. The aim of the present contribution was to use these pathways to explore what is needed to realise a
transition that successfully addresses the so-called energy policy ‘trilemma,’ i.e. the simultaneous delivery of low carbon,
secure and affordable energy services. Analytical tools were developed and applied to assess the technical feasibility,
social acceptability, and environmental and economic impacts of the pathways. Technological and behavioural develop-
ments were examined, alongside appropriate governance structures and regulations for these low-carbon transition
pathways, as well as the roles of key energy system ‘actors’ (both large and small). An assessment of the part that
could possibly be played by future demand side response was also undertaken in order to understand the factors that
drive energy demand and energy-using behaviour, and reflecting growing interest in demand side response for balancing a
system with high proportions of renewable generation. A set of interacting and complementary engineering and techno-
economic models or tools were then employed to analyse electricity network infrastructure investment and operational
decisions to assist market design and option evaluation. This provided a basis for integrating the analysis within a whole
systems framework of electricity system development, together with the evaluation of future economic benefits, costs
and uncertainties. Finally, the energy and environmental performance of the different energy mixes were appraised on a
‘life-cycle’ basis to determine the greenhouse gas emissions and other ecological or health burdens associated with each
of the three transition pathways. Here, the challenges, insights and opportunities that have been identified over the
transition towards a low-carbon future in the United Kingdom are described with the purpose of providing a valuable
evidence base for developers, policy makers and other stakeholders.
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Introduction
The energy and climate change context
Human development is underpinned by energy
sources of various kinds that heat, power and trans-
port its citizens in their everyday life. The evolution of
modern industrialised society has been interwoven
with discoveries of sources and uses of energy, espe-
cially the exploitation of fossil fuel resource stocks
and the assembly of energy system infrastructures.
Endowed with abundant coal reserves, Britain lay at
the heart of the ﬁrst industrial revolution, and from
the 1870s electric power underpinned a second indus-
trial revolution in countries like the newly-united
Germany and the United States. Nowadays, while
energy supplies and technologies underscore contin-
ued economic development, they also give rise to
unwanted side-eﬀects. They simply diﬀer in terms of
their geographic scale and level of severity between
diﬀerent energy options. Arguably the principle envir-
onmental side-eﬀect of the energy sector is the pro-
spect of global warming due to an enhanced
greenhouse eﬀect induced by combustion-generated
pollutants.1,2 Electricity generation, for example,
presently contributes approximately 30% of UK
carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions;
3,4 the principal
greenhouse gas (GHG) having an atmospheric resi-
dence time of about 100 years.1 This share mainly
arises from the use of fossil fuel (coal and natural
gas) combustion for this purpose. Changes in atmos-
pheric concentrations of GHGs aﬀect the energy bal-
ance of the global climate system. Thus, human
activities have led to quite dramatic increases since
1950 in the ‘basket’ of GHGs incorporated in the
Kyoto Protocol; concentrations have risen from 330
ppm to about 430 ppm currently.2 Prior to the ﬁrst
industrial revolution in the 18th century the atmos-
pheric concentration of Kyoto gases was only some
270 ppm. The most recent (2013) scientiﬁc assessment
by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC)2 states that it is extremely likely that humans
are the dominant inﬂuence on the observed global
warming since the mid-20th century. The British
Government has therefore introduced a tough, legally
binding target of reducing the nation’s CO2 emissions
overall by 80% by 2050 in comparison to a 1990 base-
line5 in their 2008 Climate Change Act.6 The 2015
Paris Agreement following the COP21 meeting in
that city aims to keep temperatures ‘well below 2 C
above pre-industrial levels and to pursue eﬀorts to
limit the temperature increase to 1.5 C above pre-
industrial levels.’7 The 2 C ﬁgure is broadly consist-
ent with the 2050 UK CO2 emissions target. However,
bottom-up pledges received by countries prior to the
Paris Conference (the so-called intended nationally
determined contributions (INDCs)) for national
GHG mitigation eﬀorts are expected by analysts of
the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC)7 to result in a warming
of around 2.7 C. So the world still faces a signiﬁcant
challenge of reducing GHG emissions further in order
to bring global warming into line with the aspirations
in the Paris Agreement.
Energy policy in the United Kingdom has moved
over the last decade from an emphasis on climate
change mitigation towards considerations of aﬀord-
ability and security of supply. These reﬂect the three
components of what has become known as the energy
policy trilemma.8 End-use energy demand is likely to
remain roughly around its current level, although the
energy transition out to the mid-21st century will
require some switching towards greater electricity
use, particularly for heating and transport.
Consequently, achieving the UK CO2 emissions
reduction target6 will require a greater emphasis on
systems for producing, delivering and using energy
that is not only low carbon, but also secure and
aﬀordable for consumers both large and small.8 The
preferred route to a decarbonised power generation
system9 is likely to be a mix of renewables (mainly
onshore and oﬀshore wind power), nuclear power
and fossil-fuelled power plants with CO2 capture
and geological storage (commonly known as carbon
capture and storage (CCS)10). The UK Government is
supportive of building a new generation of nuclear
reactors to replace those currently undergoing decom-
missioning, but their recent cancellation of the £1 bn
CCS competition suggests that this technology may
have an uncertain future in Britain. In any event,
the UK electricity supply network is in need of
major renewal and reconﬁguration in terms of both
power plants and grid infrastructure over the coming
decades.11
The transitions approach
A Dutch transitions approach or transitions theory
has inﬂuenced their national policy on promoting
energy system transitions,12 and stimulated historical
case studies, including applications to the Dutch
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electricity system.13 It has been used to examine the
dynamic interaction of technological and social fac-
tors at diﬀerent levels, and has generated signiﬁcant
international policy and research interest.14,15 This
analytical framework is typically coupled with a
multi-level perspective (MLP) for analysing socio-
technical transitions, based on co-evolution at and
between three levels16,17: niche innovations, socio-tech-
nical regimes and macro-landscape pressures (see
Figure 118). The landscape represents the broader pol-
itical, social and cultural values and institutions that
form the deep structural relationships of a society and
only change slowly. The socio-technical regime
reﬂects the prevailing set of routines or practices
used by actors, which create and reinforce a particular
technological system.19 In contrast, the existing
regime is thought of as generating incremental innov-
ation, whilst radical innovations are generated in
niches. The latter are spaces that are at least partially
insulated from normal market selection in the regime.
Niches provide places for learning processes to occur,
and space to build up the social networks that support
innovations, such as supply chains and user–producer
relationships. Further conceptual work has developed
a more detailed typology of transition pathways20 in
response to critiques and insights in the academic lit-
erature.21 An initial theoretical analysis of past and
possible future decarbonisation pathways for the
United Kingdom22 shows the potential for the appli-
cation of the transitions approach to the United
Kingdom. Geels et al.23 recently illustrated the appli-
cation of the MLP for a comparative analysis of low-
carbon electricity transitions in Germany and the
United Kingdom.
In the ﬁrst phase of the current research, a set of
three UK low-carbon transition pathways was
developed and analysed via an innovative collabor-
ation between engineers, social scientists and policy
analysts.8,18 This was initially funded via a strategic
partnership between E.On UK (the electricity supplier
and generator) and the UK Engineering and Physical
Sciences Research Council (EPSRC), and sought to
examine the role of electricity within the context of
Transition Pathways to a Low Carbon Economy. It
built inter alia on the transitions approach originally
devised by Dutch researchers.17,19 However, the devel-
opment of the UK transition pathways started from
narrative storylines regarding diﬀerent governance
framings,24 drawing on interviews and workshops
with stakeholders and analysis of historical analogies.
This approach combined the story-telling approach
used in exploratory scenarios, such as those developed
by the scenarios team at Shell Global (i.e. Royal
Dutch Shell plc) with detailed critical technical and
social assessments of what would be required to
bring them about. The quantiﬁed UK pathways
were named Market Rules (MR), Central Co-ordina-
tion (CC) and Thousand Flowers (TF); each reﬂecting
the dominant logic of particular governance arrange-
ments, i.e. those of the market, government and civil
society (e.g. local communities and non-governmental
organisations (NGOs)) for the evolution of the UK
power sector to 2050 (see Table 1). (The TF pathway
is loosely inspired by the late Chairman Mao
Zedong’s 1957 invitation to Communist Party cadres
in China to criticise the political system then in place
within the country: ‘Let a hundred ﬂowers blossom’
(often misquoted as the bottom-up injunction to ‘Let
a thousand ﬂowers bloom’)) They focused on the
choices and actions needed to get there from here,
and on the analysis of the pathways’ technical,
socio-economic and environmental implications.
Figure 1. Possible ‘Transition Pathways’ and the factors that influence them.
Source: The Transition Pathways Consortium.18
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An innovative, robust, and whole systems evidence base
has therefore been developed that is distinctive from
those devised elsewhere in the UK energy research
community. The pathways are not predictions or road-
maps; rather they are a way of imaginatively exploring
future possibilities, to inform proactive and protective
decision making, as well as enhancing the potential for
building consensus towards common goals. The range
of ﬁndings of the ﬁrst phase of this research were
reported in papers and associated editorial in an earlier
journal special issue.8
The issues considered
The successor (second phase) study by the same
research consortium is entitled Realising Transition
Pathways – Whole Systems Analysis for a UK More
Electric Low Carbon Energy Future, and has been
funded solely by the EPSRC. It has been aimed at
using the pathways to explore what is needed to real-
ise a transition that successfully addresses the energy
policy trilemma. The pathways again focus on the
power sector, including the potential for increasing
use of low-carbon electricity for heating and trans-
port, although within the context of key European
developments and policies. Analytical tools were
developed and applied to assess the technical feasibil-
ity, social acceptability and environmental and eco-
nomic impacts of the pathways. An assessment of
the role of future demand responses was also under-
taken in order to understand the factors that drive
energy demand and energy-using behaviour, and to
explore the growing value of ﬂexible demand as the
proportion of intermittent generation on the system
increases. A set of interacting and complementary
techno-economic models or tools were then employed
to analyse electricity network infrastructure invest-
ment and operational decisions, in order to assist
market design and subsidy mechanisms. This pro-
vided a basis for integrating the analysis within a
whole-systems framework of electricity system devel-
opment, together with the evaluation of future eco-
nomic costs, beneﬁts, risks and uncertainties. ‘A
Whole Systems Approach considers all the factors
and elements involved, including how they relate to
each other, how they work together as a whole, what
the system needs to develop, thrive, and evolve in its
environment, and how the system impacts and inter-
acts with its surrounding environment, including how
the system will be able to respond and evolve as needs
and the surrounding environment change’ (after
Ward25). Finally, the energy and environmental per-
formance of the diﬀerent energy mixes were
appraised, again on a life-cycle basis, in order to
determine the GHG emissions and other ecological
or health burdens associated with each of the three
transition pathways. These pathways have recently
been compared and contrasted with oﬃcial UK
Government energy scenarios, alongside the technol-
ogy implications.26 This paper identiﬁes challenges,
insights and opportunities in relation to the transition
towards a low-carbon future in the United Kingdom
by synthesising the range of analysis undertaken
within this research, in order to provide a valuable
evidence base for developers, policy makers and
other stakeholders.
The transition pathways demand and
supply portfolios
An iterative approach was used to provide quantiﬁca-
tion of the demand and supply proﬁles for the transi-
tion pathways to 2050, by iterating between the
narrative storylines and exploration of the pathways
with a range of modelling and analysis tools.24 Key
characteristics of the three transition pathways are
summarised in Table 1.24 The starting point for the
quantiﬁcation of version 2.1 these pathways was the
projection of annual electricity demand by sector
from 2010 to 2050.26,28 In the MR pathway, annual
Table 1. Key characteristics of the UK transition pathways.
Pathway designation Market rules (MR) Central co-ordination (CC) Thousand flowers (TF)
Governance logic Market Government Civil society
Critical technologies Fossil fuel (coal and gas) CCS;
nuclear power; offshore
wind
Fossil fuel (coal and gas) CCS;
nuclear power; offshore wind
Solar photovoltaic (PV) arrays; onshore
and offshore wind; renewable com-
bined heat and power (CHP)
Important trends Limited interference in
market arrangements; high
level policy targets and
high carbon price.
Central government commission
tranches of low-carbon gener-
ation from big companies to
reduce risk of low carbon
investment.
Local, bottom-up diverse solutions led
by local communities and NGOs,
greater community ownership and
more engagement of end-user.
Electricity demand Increase demand for heating
and transport. Overall
demand in 2050 (512
TWh) much greater than
today.
Increase demand for heating and
transport, but reduced through
energy efficiency. Overall demand
in 2050 (410 TWh) slightly higher
than today.
Overall demand in 2050 (310 TWh)
lower than today. Higher rate of
energy efficiency improvements and
more aware consumers.
Source: Adapted from Foxon.24
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electricity demand rises from 337 TWh in 2010 to
about 512 TWh in 205026,28 (see again Table 1), due
to increasing use of electricity for industry, commer-
cial, transport and domestic space heating and hot
water. In contrast, annual electricity demand under
the CC pathway rises from 337 TWh in 2010 to
some 410 TWh in 205026,28 (Table 1). This pathway
sees electricity demand rising and then levelling oﬀ
from 2030 onwards, due to increasing use of electricity
for transport and domestic space heating and hot
water. However, it suggests higher rates of energy eﬃ-
ciency improvements in the domestic sector, and a
smaller, highly eﬃcient industrial sector with lower
levels of output. This would imply that some
energy-intensive UK production has moved to other
countries, increasing the national consumption of
goods produced abroad, implying that UK carbon
emissions calculated on a consumption basis would
continue to diverge from those on a production
basis. Finally, under the TF pathway, the annual elec-
tricity demand falls from 337 TWh in 2010 to only
around 310 TWh in 205026,28 (Table 1). Despite simi-
lar levels of electriﬁcation of transport to that in the
other pathways, electricity demand falls due to even
higher rates of energy eﬃciency improvements in the
domestic and commercial sectors. Again, a small,
highly eﬃcient industrial sector with low levels of
output aids the reduction in electricity demand. In
all pathways, a signiﬁcant amount of energy is used
in industry and commerce for space heating and water
heating. The provision of this heat is mostly via the
same technologies as in the domestic sector of each
pathway but often on a larger scale. Thus, in the MR
and CC pathways, an increasing amount of electricity
is used in heat pumps in the industrial and commercial
sectors. This increase in demand for electricity for
heating and hot water is additional demand to that
required for electriﬁcation of transport, and it leads to
a signiﬁcant rise in total ﬁnal electricity demand in
these pathways. However, under the TF pathway,
the total ﬁnal electricity demand remains stable up
to 2050, as the increase in transport electricity con-
sumption is oﬀset by reductions in demand as a result
of energy eﬃciency improvements. Thus, there is no
rise in electricity demand for heating and hot water
under the TF pathway, mainly due to the expansion
of community-scale renewable combined heat and
power (CHP).
The associated demand projections for version 2.1
of all the pathways26 are met by rising levels of low-
carbon electricity generation, including diﬀerent gen-
eration capacities of renewables, nuclear power and
fossil fuels (e.g. coal and, in the future, mainly gas)
with CCS, operating at diﬀerent capacity factors. The
detailed generation capacity schedule for each path-
way from 2010 to 2050 is reported by Barnacle et al.27
and Barton et al.28: see Figures 2 to 4 (corresponding
demand projections were presented graphically by
Barton et al.26). In 2010, the United Kingdom had
around 95 GW of electricity generation capacity,
including 29 GW of coal and dual-fuel generation,
33 GW of gas-ﬁred generation, 11 GW of nuclear
power, 9 GW of renewable generation and 6 GW of
CHP cogeneration.27,28 Signiﬁcant amounts of cap-
acity are then required to come on stream under the
MR pathway in the 2020s26 (see Figure 2).
Subsequently, 21 GW of fossil-fuelled with CCS, 15
GW of nuclear power and 47 GW of renewables (47
GW) by 2030,26 giving a total capacity of around 130
GW by 2030.27,28 This deployment leads to further
Figure 2. Generation capacity in the Market Rules pathway for the UK.
Source: Updated from Barnacle et al.27
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increases in capacity in order to meet rising electricity
demand over following decades, particularly from
industry and electriﬁcation of heating and transport.26
Thus, a total of some 168 GW of capacity is installed
by 2050, including 44 GW of fossil-fuelled generation
with CCS, 26 GW of nuclear power, and 80 GW of
renewable capacity, principally from onshore (23
GW) and oﬀshore (30 GW) wind turbines, tidal
power (12 GW) and renewable CHP (9 GW).26
There are likely to be similar investments in all
types of low-carbon generation capacity under the
CC pathway during the 2020s26 (see Figure 3); per-
haps co-ordinated by a Strategic Energy Agency. This
could lead to a total of some 122 GW in 2030, includ-
ing high levels of nuclear power (22 GW), slightly
lower levels of fossil-fuelled power generation with
CCS (18 GW), and less renewables (43 GW).27,28
Electricity demand levels oﬀ under this pathway, but
further power plant deployment would be required in
order to increase the capacity to about 151 GW in
total by 2050.26 The main contributions are likely to
come from nuclear power (30 GW) and fossil-fuelled
power generation with CCS (30 GW), although the
latter operates at a lower capacity factor (36%),
because it again partly provides a back-up for inter-
mittent renewables (65 GW).26 Finally, action by
community groups as well as local and regional
Energy Service Companies (ESCos) under the TF
pathway result in a signiﬁcant expansion of commu-
nity-based and microscale renewable CHP installed
from 2020 onwards.26 This reaches a total capacity
of 37 GW by 2030 and about 149 GW by 205027,28
(see Figure 4). This is at a similar level to that under
the CC pathway, although most plant is made up of
renewable generation (112 GW). A signiﬁcant
proportion of demand under the TF pathway is met
by local-scale renewables26; from renewable (biogas)
community-scale and micro-CHP systems (44 GW),
followed by onshore wind turbines (21 GW), solar
photovoltaic (PV) arrays (16 GW) and oﬀshore
wind farms (8 GW). There are also likely to be
some low-carbon investments in earlier periods; pos-
sibly leading to 22 GW of fossil-fuelled power plant
with CCS and 5 GW of nuclear capacity by 2050.
Insights from historical transitions
The present transition pathways consortium has
sought to learn from past socio-technical transitions
in order to help explore future transitions and what
might enable or avoid them. Studies of historical
energy and infrastructure transitions have helped
understand the dynamics and timing of transitions
(see, e.g. Wilson and Grubler29). While most attention
has been paid to transition successes, belated atten-
tion is now being paid to transition failures and resist-
ance to change by incumbent ﬁrms, as well as their
fuels, technologies and institutions. Historical case
studies also help illustrate the possibility of radical
or rapid transformation; and raise questions about
the received wisdom regarding past successes/failures
of socio-technical transitions, policies and technolo-
gies. The value of historical case studies as analogues
lies not in their perfect ﬁt with modern technologies or
circumstances (which is unlikely), but in being similar
in one or more aspects.
Two supply-side case studies have been carried out
by Johnson et al.30 to compare transition experiences
and branching points of emerging alternative liquid
fuels in Britain during previous recession and
Figure 3. Generation capacity in the Central Co-ordination pathway for the UK.
Source: Updated from Barnacle et al.27
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growth periods between the First and Second World
Wars (WWI and WWII), i.e. 1918–1938. The case
studies focussed on alcohol fuel produced by the
Distillers Company Ltd. (DCL) for power generation
and a petrol-from-coal produced by Imperial
Chemical Industries (ICI). Both fuels received govern-
ment support during a time of rapid growth in the
motor industry, ﬂuctuating economic conditions and
fears of absolute oil shortages. They represent exam-
ples of failed attempts at path creation and transition.
Nevertheless, the studies30 identiﬁed the importance
of network infrastructure, ownership of this infra-
structure, and the impact of energy security on
prevailing governance logics. It built on the govern-
ance framings or logics of the action-space framework
(see Figure 5); conceptualised by Jacquie Burgess,
Tom Hargreaves and other colleagues in the predeces-
sor transitions pathways project.8 It illustrates the
three governance logics, or ways of framing energy
challenges, whereby interactions in the action-space
vary with circumstances and actor agency.24
Johnson et al.30 observed that when energy is seen
as ‘insecure,’ it tends to be framed as a social service
(or article of warlike material) rather than a commod-
ity, with growing political legitimacy of policy inter-
ventions. They found that crude oil market instability,
Figure 4. Generation capacity in the Thousand Flowers pathway for the UK.
Source: Updated from Barnacle et al.27
Figure 5. The dynamic relationship between energy security, framing of energy and governance logics.
Source: Johnson et al.30
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support for a declining coal industry, and militaristic
needs all motivated the search for these alternative
liquid fuels in the inter-war period. Governance of
fuel distribution had signiﬁcant eﬀects on the eco-
nomic feasibility of both fuels and their ability to
penetrate a market dominated by the oil industry
incumbents. Changing characteristics of energy secur-
ity inﬂuenced the framing of energy and shifts in gov-
ernment support for alternative transport fuels. Lack
of state regulation of incumbent oil company cartels
and access to fuel distribution infrastructure impeded
emergence of these new fuels. This analysis of failed
attempts at path creation30 can therefore usefully
inform understanding of current energy governance
and low carbon transitions.
Shifting views about how security aﬀected the
framing of energy emerged between WWI and
WWII; leading to the prevalence again of hybrid gov-
ernance. A relational approach was used by Johnson
et al.30 to explore the emergence of policy support for
fuels and their ﬁnal withdrawal. That showed how
and why emerging technological substitutes can foun-
der and transitions fail in times of economic instabil-
ity. It led to shifting hybrid state and market
governance between incumbents (i.e. the oil majors)
and newcomers (e.g. DCL and ICI). These studies
consequently reﬂect a partial historical analogue for
the hybrid roles of the state and the market in energy
governance (e.g. UK Electricity Market Reform
(EMR)), as well as the changing priorities within the
energy policy trilemma between climate change miti-
gation and the provision of secure and aﬀordable
energy services. The case studies also provide insights
about technological substitutes and new infrastruc-
tures (electrifying transport and heat), as well as con-
cerns about the inﬂuence of incumbent actors and
institutions inﬂuence to either advance or constrain
low-carbon transitions.
A further supply-side study of the development of
the integrated UK natural gas system over the period
1960–2010 by Arapostathis et al.31 has illustrated the
way in which such integration was closely linked to
governance patterns. This explored the development
of the gas system in two transitions: (i) from town to
natural gas with state governance logic (under the
management of the nationalised British Gas
Corporation); and (ii) then privatisation and liberal-
isation after 1987. The latter major structural change
is regulated by Ofgem, with a Uniform Network Code
(UNC) overseen by the Joint Oﬃce of Gas
Transporters. Vertical integration has been aided by
new control and communication technologies,
together with internationalisation via gas interconnec-
tors. That reduced uncertainties, but increased the
system’s complexity. This case study31 provided an
analogue for the challenges of integrating large, infra-
structural technical systems for a sustainability tran-
sition. It is inscribed within the MLP approach yet
concentrates on system integration as a complex and
uncertain socio-technical process. It indicates
how quite dramatic changes in the UK natural gas
structure are mirrored in regime formation (see
Figure 1).
Little historical work has been undertaken on
energy demand reduction. A study of electric heating
in early post-war Britain32 when electric ﬁres were
used at peak times and were therefore particularly
problematic in terms of energy end-use, oﬀers insights
into the challenges often associated with demand
reduction. The Electricity Development Association
(EDA), originally established as a public relations
arm of the UK electricity industry, tried simultan-
eously to reduce undesirable peak demand, whilst
encouraging increased demand more generally. In
the late 1940s, it recommended that electric ﬁres
should not be used to meet peak demand. However,
in the 1950s and 1960s it concentrated on promoting
oﬀ-peak heating appliances. It ﬁrst sought to do this
in the United Kingdom via under-ﬂoor heating, and
then block storage heaters typically composed of clay
bricks or other ceramic material. The study under the
auspices of the transition pathways consortium by
Carlsson-Hyslop32 analysed the way in which the
London County Council (LCC) and its tenants
adopted and adapted electric underﬂoor heating. It
concluded that attempts by the electricity industry
during the period 1945–1964 had only a limited
eﬀect on the trend towards rising energy end-use
demand. This was, in part, due to EDA promotional
eﬀorts. This analysis is consistent with that on house-
holds’ engagement with customer-facing elements of a
smarter grid, such as smart meters or energy monitors
(see, e.g. a predecessor consortium study by
Hargreaves et al.33). Social variables like daily rou-
tines, individual preferences and social relations in a
household were found by Hargreaves et al.33 to be
important for energy demand reduction. This may
reﬂect a co-evolution of technology with social prac-
tices, changing routines, and behaviour. It illustrates
the kinds of processes, practices, interactions and
modes of governance that need to be considered if
demand management/energy eﬃciency are to succeed
in containing energy use and GHGs, whilst enhancing
the quality of people’s lives.
Policy makers tend to have little institutional
memory of what has worked or has not worked in
terms of energy sector interventions, because job
changes are used to enable UK civil servants to gain
experience and avoid accumulating positional or
departmental loyalty, and because ministers often
serve for short periods (from 2008 to 2015 of the
four Secretaries of State for Energy and Climate
Change, one served for less than 2 years and another
for just over 1 year). Historical analyses/stories of
past transitions therefore help them (and other stake-
holders) to understand how and why transitions have
previously succeeded or failed. They also indicate how
long they can take to implement and the reasons why.
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Overall insights and lessons from such studies can be
summarised as:
. The historical studies have shown that rapid
change is possible, but not necessarily frequent. It
may require a recognition of the need to change,
openness to experiment and a high degree of co-
ordination (e.g. the natural gas transition). These
studies illustrate how co-evolutionary and co-con-
structed are the material or physical aspects with
the social, political and institutional aspects. For
example, the 1966–1977 conversion from town
gas to natural gas required both technical changes,
including building the national gas grid and install-
ing new burners in millions of gas appliances, along
with major institutional reorganisation, new work-
force training and political support.31
. Historical studies of two alternatives to petrol in
the inter-war period30 show how and why emerging
technological substitutes can founder and potential
transitions fail in times of economic instability,
shifting governance and competition between
incumbents and newcomers.
. A further supply-side study of the development of
the integrated UK natural gas system over the
period 1960–201031 suggests that such integration
was closely linked to governance patterns. It indi-
cated how quite dramatic changes in the UK nat-
ural gas structure are largely reﬂected in regime
formation and change.
. There is little historical work on demand reduction.
However, the recent study of the EDA and domes-
tic electric heating in post-war Britain32 suggests
that their attempts had limited impacts on the
trend of rising demand, and thereby illustrates
the challenges facing demand reduction today.
Horizon scanning and technology
assessment of energy systems
Technological choices in the UK power sector are
likely to vary signiﬁcantly out to 2050. For example,
over the last few years the outlook for both coal-ﬁred
power stations with CCS and nuclear power has chan-
ged dramatically. The UK Government indicated (in
November 2015) their wish to phase out unabated
coal-ﬁred power stations by 2025, and giving new
gas-ﬁred power stations priority. Likewise, the pro-
spects of new nuclear build has been hit by both con-
cerns following the 2011 Fukushima disaster in Japan
and a reassessment of the economics of nuclear power
by some of the big players, such as the investment
decision by the French utility eDF Energy in regard
to the construction of the Hinkley Point C nuclear
power plant (in Somerset). These short-term changes
in attitudes to low-carbon technologies mean that the
technology choices implicit in each of the existing
pathways need to be kept under continuous review.
Horizon scanning involves a portfolio of methods that
enable energy researchers and other power sector
stakeholders to increase their awareness of important
emerging inﬂuences on the UK energy system and its
environment. It provides a major strand in proactive
risk management11 and strategic thinking as the UK
energy sector moves forward. Parker et al.,34 for
example, used a modiﬁed Delphi technique for hori-
zon scanning in order to identify some 30 emergent
policy issues, which strongly featured science and
technology, and which would necessitate public
engagement as the policies were being developed.
This was driven, in part, by concerns over the use of
hydraulic fracturing (or fracking) by fossil fuel com-
panies for shale gas extraction in the United
Kingdom. A disparate group of people with interests
over the science and policy interface (e.g. policy
makers and advisers, academics and the private
sector) initially elicited a long list of issues. These
were then reﬁned into a shorter list that were viewed
as being of top priority for policy makers. They
included challenges related to energy and environ-
ment, such as policies concerning interdisciplinary
whole energy systems science (incorporated by a part-
ner in the Realising Transition Pathways Consortium
(Jason Chilvers)34). A variety of alternative tech-
niques are available for use in identifying emerging
issues in the UK energy sector. Arup Foresight (part
of the independent ﬁrm of designers, planners, engin-
eers and consultants) have, for example, employed
STEEP (social, technological, economic, environmen-
tal, political) analysis to examine drivers for change in
both the energy and climate change ﬁelds. The
Realising Transition Pathways Consortium have used
a similar approach, in conjunction with more formal
methods of Technology Assessment35,36 to evaluate a
number of the main disruptive energy technologies.
These studies have sought to identify the components
of a balance sheet of technological credits and debits
in order to evaluate their societal impacts, and to
determine whether they are compatible with
Britain’s move towards a low-carbon future in 2050
and beyond.
Indicative energy technology assessments (ETAs)
have been carried out for a variety of energy technol-
ogies, e.g. UK shale gas extraction,37 carbon capture
and storage (CCS),38,39 advanced rechargeable bat-
teries,40 rare earth elements (REE) as a constraint
on clean energy technologies,41 nuclear power
plants42 and tidal power barrages.43 These ETAs
were all indicative in the sense of being a simpliﬁed
evaluation and illustration of the performance of
state-of-the-art devices. Nevertheless, such assess-
ments provide a valuable evidence base for devel-
opers, policy makers and other stakeholders. Each
technology was evaluated using a combination of
quantitative and qualitative methods within the
spirit of the STEEP approach. The most controversial
of these studies was arguably that concerning the
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beneﬁts and ‘costs’ of shale gas fracking in Britain.34,37
Exploratory drilling in the United Kingdom is at an
early stage, with great uncertainty over the scale of the
potential shale gas resource.37 However, such activ-
ities are already meeting ﬁerce community resistance.
Like all energy technologies, it exhibits unwanted
side-eﬀects that simply diﬀer in their level of severity
compared to other options. Successful extraction
might contribute positively in terms of fuel security
and independence, as well as jobs and growth.37
Shale gas may also make a contribution to attaining
the UK’s statutory GHG emissions targets, although
potentially harmful environmental impacts need to be
satisfactorily resolved via appropriate monitoring and
robust regulation. It is unlikely that gas bills for UK
household and industrial consumers would fall dra-
matically as they have done in North America,
because Britain is linked to the wider European gas
market. Anything produced in the United Kingdom
would be a ‘drop in the ocean’ compared to imports
via either pipelines or by way of liqueﬁed natural gas
(LNG) tankers. Finally, the socio-economic advan-
tages and disadvantages of shale gas fracking are
not evenly distributed between various communities
and demographic groups.37 Community engagement
in a genuinely participative process – where the gov-
ernment is prepared to change course in response to
the evidence and public opinion – will consequently be
critically important for the adoption of any new
energy option.
CCS facilities coupled to fossil fuelled power plants
or industrial sites provide a key climate change miti-
gation strategy that potentially permits the continued
use of fossil fuel resources, whilst reducing the CO2
emissions. Hammond and Spargo39 highlight the
potential design routes for the capture, transport,
clustering and storage of CO2 from UK power
plants. Both currently available and novel CCS tech-
nologies were evaluated. Due to lower operating eﬃ-
ciencies, the CCS plants showed a longer energy
payback period and a lower energy gain ratio than
conventional plant. There are also several technical
and ﬁnancial obstacles that need to be overcome,38
including the adoption of an appropriate legislative
framework and the need for full CCS chain risk
assessments. There are uncertainties over the full-
scale power plant CCS technical performance and
costs, which may only become clearer when the ﬁrst
demonstrators are operational. Unfortunately, the
UK Government cancelled (on 25 November 2015)
their £1 bn CCS competition shortly before the win-
ning consortium was due to be announced. Inevitably,
the bidding companies were dismayed by this out-
come and the prospects for CCS in Britain in the
short term now looks rather bleak. Prior to this, the
Government had established a CCS Cost Reduction
Task Force44 as an industry-led joint venture to
assist with the challenge of making CCS a commer-
cially viable operation by the early 2020s. The main
cost-reduction opportunities were seen as being44: (i)
transport and storage scale and utilisation, (ii)
improved ﬁnanceability for the CCS chain, and ﬁnally
(iii) improved engineering designs and performance.
Greater ﬁnancial incentives for carbon abatement
could, in principal, be secured through a higher
carbon price from the European Union Emissions
Trading Scheme (EU ETS), although that has been
a signiﬁcant disappointment in terms of the carbon
price level. A collaborative study between the
Energy Technologies Institute (ETI), a public-private
partnership of key industrial companies and UK fun-
ders of energy RD&D, and the Ecoﬁn Research
Foundation (ERF)45 has recently examined the con-
ditions required for mobilising private sector ﬁnan-
cing of CCS in the United Kingdom. They argue
that this technology would be a ‘huge prize’ that
could cut the annual costs of meeting the 2050
carbon target by up to 1% of gross domestic product
(GDP).38,39,45 But they noted that the prevailing
ﬁnancial market conditions are demanding. In order
to meet this challenge, they suggest that the United
Kingdom needs to build conﬁdence in long-term
policy, develop attractive pricing for CCS contracts
with suitable risk sharing, put in place an appropriate
regulatory and market framework, and devise new
ways to oﬀset North Sea storage liability risks.45
Many believe that the UK Government will need
to return to CCS deployment in order to meet its
2050 GHG emissions reduction target in a cost-
eﬀective way.46
Two other large-scale power generators that could
be available to help secure a low-carbon future for the
United Kingdom are nuclear power plants42 and tidal
barrages.43 The lives of existing nuclear plant has typ-
ically been extended to around 40 years (e.g.
Hunterston B was ﬁnanced for 25 years with an
expectation of 35 years, and subsequently extended
by 7 years). Nevertheless Britain, as with other
nuclear-powered European countries, will be progres-
sively decommissioning its older nuclear power sta-
tions during the next decade or so. This will leave
only the Sizewell B pressurised water reactor (PWR)
station in the United Kingdom, with nuclear power
holding a considerably reduced share of electricity
generation (perhaps as low as 3% by 2020 from
around 20% in the winter of 2013–2014). A new gen-
eration of nuclear power stations may therefore need
to be part of the power generation mix in order to
decarbonise the electricity sector by around 2030–
2050. In Europe these plants are likely to be variants
of the third-generation European pressurised reactor
(EPR) design. Emerging (novel) nuclear reactor
designs are thought to be inherently safer and less
costly42; perhaps having a 25% lower generating
cost than present systems. However, the research by
the former UK Sustainable Development
Commission47 suggests that a doubling of Britain’s
existing nuclear capacity would only yield an 8%
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cut on CO2 emissions by 2035. Over the longer term,
it is likely that the European governments will want to
keep a watching brief on advanced nuclear reactors
(including modular designs) that are currently being
developed in France/Germany, South Africa and the
United States. Nevertheless, they will no doubt want
to be reassured that such new technologies will be
commercially viable.42 The adoption of either short-
or medium-term technologies would obviously be crit-
ically dependent on public attitudes to nuclear power
in Britain and elsewhere.1,11,42 Both the Cardiﬀ-
Weston and the smaller Shoots barrages on the
River Severn between Somerset and south Wales
have been evaluated by Hammond et al.43 using vari-
ous ETA techniques to determine their net energy
output, carbon footprint and ﬁnancial investment cri-
teria, alongside various critical technical and environ-
mental issues. These tidal power schemes were
assessed over their foreseen lifespan of 120 years in
terms of its cradle-to-site, operation and maintenance
requirements. The proposed Cardiﬀ-Weston Barrage
would yield relatively attractive ﬁgures of merit in
terms of its net energy and carbon emissions, although
its ﬁnancial performance is poorer than alternative
power generators. Comparisons were made with the
much smaller, Shoots Barrage scheme that would be
located up-river of the Severn road crossings, and
which is favoured by environmental groups, because
of its more benign ecological and environmental
impacts.43
The suitability of advanced rechargeable battery
technologies (ARBT) for diﬀerent applications, such
as electric vehicles (EV), consumer electronics, load
levelling and stationary power storage, has been the
subject of another ETA.40 These energy storage
devices were compared to more mature nickel–cad-
mium (Ni–Cd) batteries in order to gain a sense of
perspective regarding the performance of the ARBT.
Lithium (Li)-ion batteries (LIB) currently dominate
the rechargeable battery market and are likely to con-
tinue to do so in the short term in view of their excel-
lent all-round performance,40 and ﬁrm grip on
consumer electronics. However, in view of the compe-
tition from Li-Ion Polymer (LIP) batteries their long-
term future is uncertain. Although, if safety concerns
are overcome and costs fall signiﬁcantly, there may be
growth in the EV sector and to a lesser extent load-
levelling, where LIB can exploit their relatively high
cycle life.40 Rare earth batteries and magnets are key
elements of hybrid vehicles and gearless wind tur-
bines, and phosphors are critical in energy saving
lighting. Hammond and Mitchell41 argued that ‘rare
earth elements’ (REE) may place a signiﬁcant con-
straint on the development of some low-carbon (or
clean) energy technologies. These materials are not
actually rare in terms of their abundance, but the
number and location of mines are restricted due, in
part, to economic considerations. Current REE
reserves stand at about 110 million tonnes with
around half in the People’s Republic of China
(PRC), although other countries like the United
States, Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
(the former Soviet Republics) and Australia hold sub-
stantial reserves. Production in China dominates the
market, with 97% of the global total, and this will
remain so until new mines are developed. The PRC
has limited its export of REE in order to give prefer-
ence to the export of manufactured products.
Diversity of the global supply chain is therefore a cru-
cial issue moving forward (see Figure 6). It is likely
that supply constraints will become less critical in the
medium to long term as more mines come into oper-
ation, and thus further reserves become available.41
Such constraints could be eased by reducing the
amount of material required per application, or chan-
ging the technology altogether. LIB,40 for example,
are already a viable replacement for nickel-metal-
hydride units in hybrid vehicles. Their costs have
Figure 6. Diversity of global ‘rare earth elements’ (REE) supply over the medium term. Note: ‘Current’ reflects the 2011 baseline.41
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fallen from >£1680/kWh in 1990 to <£140/kWh
today. REE are not currently recycled, either pre or
post-use. There are processes available that could be
utilised for this purpose, although they do not cur-
rently appear to be economically viable options.41
In order to round-oﬀ these ETA-like studies, an
evaluation of the energy densities and spatial foot-
prints of both conventional and renewable generators
was undertaken by Cheng and Hammond48 on a life-
cycle (or cradle-to-gate) basis. It was stimulated by a
desire to test an assertion by Fells49 that renewable
energy technologies for electricity generation (such as
bioenergy plants, solar PV cell arrays, wind turbines
and the like) have a low energy density in comparison
with fossil fuel or nuclear power stations. He sug-
gested, for example, that if all the wind farms operat-
ing in the world in about the year 2000 were to be
concentrated on the South Downs of England, then
only 10% of UK electricity demand would be met. On
a similar basis, he argued49 that in order to replace
Scotland’s two nuclear power stations a total of
10,000 250 kW LIMPET-type wave power generators
(i.e. shoreline oscillating water column devices) would
be required of the type installed on the island of Islay
(one of the Hebridean islands; oﬀ the north west coast
of Scotland). In the case of biomass energy, Fells49
postulated that an area the size of the county of
Kent would have to be covered in coppiced willow
in order to replace half of the output from
Dungeness B nuclear power station (a 1040 MW
plant consisting of two AGRs, and located in the
same county). The nuclear fuel cycle (both with diﬀu-
sion and centrifuge enrichment) was found by Cheng
and Hammond48 to have the highest energy density of
the technologies they examined, with bioenergy plants
having the lowest. Their results are summarised in
Table 2, where they are compared with those of
Gagnon et al.50 and of the US Environmental
Working Group (EWG).51 Onshore wind power
exhibited a relatively promising energy density and
is greater than that of its oﬀshore counterpart, the
energy density of the latter fell below that of solar
PV arrays. Thus, renewables were found to produce
dilute electricity overall with a spatial footprint that is
orders-of-magnitude higher than for conventional
sources. That was in line with the views of Fells,49
although there are many other sustainability criteria
that will determine their usefulness in the transition
towards a low carbon future.48
The horizon scanning and technology assessment
of the energy options34–36 that will inﬂuence the three
UK transition pathways contributes to an under-
standing the future interplay of the energy policy tri-
lemma, i.e. achieving deep GHG emission cuts, whilst
maintaining a secure and aﬀordable energy system,
and addressing how resulting tensions might be
resolved. Overall insights and lessons from such stu-
dies can be summarised, for example, as:
. Shale gas extraction has potential unwanted side-
eﬀects, and is already meeting community resist-
ance and controversy. A balance sheet approach
has been used to determine the beneﬁts and dis-
beneﬁts of shale gas fracking.37 It may contribute
to energy security, jobs and growth, as well as
attaining national GHG targets over the medium
term. Thus, it might form the basis of a transitional
energy strategy for the United Kingdom, although
the wider environmental impacts will require
appropriate and robust regulations to be enforced.
. Carbon capture and storage (CCS) from fossil-fuel
power stations is likely to be a key technology in
achieving a low carbon future in the United
Kingdom at a reasonable cost.38 Energy and
carbon analyses have been undertaken, along
with indicative cost estimates, for fossil-fuelled
power stations with and without CCS.39 It could
signiﬁcantly cut GHG emissions, provided techno-
logical and ﬁnancial obstacles can be overcome.
. Large-scale nuclear power plants and tidal power
barrages both exhibit attractive ﬁgures of merit in
terms of their overall energy performance and
near-zero carbon emissions, but have very long
ﬁnancial payback periods.40,43 The latter makes
them diﬃcult to undertake with the support of
only private sector investors. Nuclear power also
gives rise to ongoing problems with high and inter-
mediate-level waste disposal,40 although a deep
underground repository is the preferred option.
The siting of such a facility has yet to be resolved
in the United Kingdom. A tidal barrage built
across the Severn Estuary would inevitably give
rise to signiﬁcant ecological modiﬁcations to the
aquatic environment.43
. The suitability of ARBT have been evaluated for
diﬀerent applications.40 While LIBs are likely to
continue to dominate the rechargeable battery
market in the short term, their long-term future is
uncertain, because of competition from LIP bat-
teries. There may be some LIBs growth in the elec-
tric vehicle sector, if safety concerns are overcome
Table 2. A comparison of the spatial footprints per unit of
output from various power generators.
Energy metric Spatial footprints (km2/TWh)
Energy
system
Gagnon
et al.50 EWG51
Cheng and
Hammond48
Coal 4.00 3.63 –
Natural gas – 0.09 –
Nuclear 0.50 0.48 0.30
Wind 72.00 2.33–116.66 1.15–44.17
PV 45.00 13.50–27.00 16.17–20.47
Biomass 533–2200.00 1320–2200.00 470.00
Source: Adapted from Cheng and Hammond.48
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and costs fall signiﬁcantly, and somewhat less in
load-levelling, through their relatively high cycle
life.
. Rare earth batteries and magnets are key elements
in the hybrid vehicles and gearless wind turbines, as
are phosphors in energy-saving lighting, but short-
term economic mining constraints on REE may
limit their development.41 Such concerns could
also be eased by using less material per application,
recycling REE, either pre- or post-use, or changing
the technology altogether.
. The energy densities and spatial footprints of vari-
ous power generators were evaluated on a life-cycle
basis.48 The nuclear fuel cycle was found to have
the highest energy density, with bioenergy plants
having the lowest. Onshore wind power exhibited
a relatively promising energy density; being greater
than that for its oﬀshore counterpart. The energy
density of the latter fell below that of solar PV
arrays.
Electricity system and network
modelling and evaluation
Background
A number of reputable studies have been undertaken
over recent years that support low or zero carbon
energy scenarios for the United Kingdom. These
include those produced by the British Government’s
Department of Energy and Climate Change (the DECC
2050 Calculator52), the UK Energy Research Centre
(the UKERC Energy 2050 Project53), and the
Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research.54 They
all enable insights to be drawn regarding the realism
of each scenario set, and reﬂect a range of aspirations
from those wishing to achieve 2050 carbon reduction
targets: 80% in the case of DECC52 and UKERC53
projections. However, the ﬁve Tyndall decarbonisa-
tion scenarios54 focused on an earlier 60% carbon
reduction target for 2050, although they employ a dis-
tinctive backcasting approach generated and reviewed
with the aid of stakeholders. On the other hand, the
DECC 2050 Calculator is basically an engineering-
based, Excel spreadsheet model that is open source
and arguably transparent. The tool permits users to
select their own combination of technologies to
achieve an 80% reduction in GHG emissions by
2050, whilst ensuring that energy supply and
demand are balanced. The UKERC Energy 2050
Project53 employed a core four-scenario core set that
was underpinned by a single cost-optimisation model
(UK MARKAL). It took ‘an eclectic approach to
scenario building’53 with a backcasting dimension to
achieve a combination of UK energy resilience and
climate change mitigation. In contrast, the quantiﬁca-
tion of the three pathways developed by the Realising
Transition Pathways Consortium was underpinned by
a suite of multiple models.
From narrative descriptions of the transition
pathways to model formulation
A range of models were developed to elaborate/explore
demand, supply and infrastructure aspects26 and feed
into revising the pathways, both quantitatively and
qualitatively in the second iteration for version 2.1 of
the transition pathways. Qualitatively this has involved
building narrative stories out to 2050, whilst quantita-
tively it has necessitated the construction of matching,
consistent spreadsheets of demand, supply, technolo-
gies and (implicit) infrastructure. This was a challen-
ging and time-consuming process, but one that yielded
a valuable learning experience. Electricity models were
used to variously address hourly, annual and seasonal
balancing on regional, national and international
scales. An informative multi-modelling comparison of
the pathways was then undertaken to innovatively link
and embed narrative storylines to technological, eco-
nomic, social and institutional drivers and constraints.
The framework of eight models and appraisal tools (see
Figure 7 for the suite of individual models as of April
2013) were iteratively linked and checked for consist-
ency between the various tools and the narrative
descriptions of the pathways. This exercise was under-
taken by the postgraduate researchers functioning as
what was known in the Realising Transition Pathways
Consortium as the Engine Room55 the researchers
working independently of the consortium leadership
(the academic co-investigators).
This cross-scale study was based on the storyline or
narrative description of the CC pathway,8,24 which was
then evaluated via six power system models and two
appraisal techniques. It was used to iteratively link
the CC narrative with the models/appraisal tools.
Harmonised assumptions on power system inputs and
system output targets for each model or tool were ini-
tially extracted from the CC pathway storyline.8,24 The
framework of models (see again Figure 7) was then
employed to map the key features of each model/
appraisal tool in terms of their temporal, spatial and
disciplinary perspectives. Clearly, the narrative descrip-
tion of the CC pathway8,24 was found to be critical for
transmitting information about governance logic and
the choices of key actors. Nevertheless, many of these
parameters were found to be inconsistent. Typically, the
CC storyline resulted in an overestimate of demand
reduction levels, the uptake of CCS and marine renew-
ables. This is because the narrative storyline tends to
underestimate the technical and economic challenges
associated with these levels of demand reduction and
uptake of CCS and marine renewables. These were sub-
sequently highlighted through the quantitative model-
ling analysis. Likewise, the narrative description led to
an underestimate of the supply-demand balancing
requirement, the need for back-up capacity, and the
role of nuclear power and interconnectors with
Europe, compared to the challenges identiﬁed through
the modelling in achieving these outcomes.
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The eight models and appraisal tools (in the order
of their breadth of power system boundaries, and in
line with the sequence indicated in Figure 7) were:
. Demand: This energy demand model (for full details
see Barton et al.28) is a highly disaggregated
simulation model of UK energy demand for both
the domestic and non-domestic sectors. Its primary
inputs are a range of characteristics,26,52 including
energy service levels, user practices, choices of
appliances, building fabric, fuels, deployment of
distributed generation, and other parameters,
Figure 7. The framework of quantitative models utilised within the Realising Transition Pathways project.
Source: The Transition Pathways Consortium.55
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with its main output being ﬁnal energy demand
across the UK building stock.
. FESA: The future energy scenario analysis (FESA)
model (for full details see Barnacle et al.27) is a
single-year UK power generation and demand
simulation model, incorporating 1-hour time steps
for dispatch modelling. The overall structure of
this model is depicted in Figure 8. It utilises 2001
UK Met Oﬃce weather data on temperature, wind
speeds, solar radiation and wave height. The FESA
model incorporates technical feasibility constraints
on the power network, and enables hourly grid-
balancing.
. D-EXPANSE: This model (dynamic version of
exploration of patterns in near-optimal energy sce-
narios; for full details see Trutnevyte56) is a power
system optimisation model. D-EXPANSE system-
atically explores the various near-cost-optimal
pathways, as well as the structural uncertainty,
based on key inputs of demand, technology costs
and characteristics, fuel prices and power system
transmission topology. Its main output in terms
of UK power systems conﬁguration and costs has
been validated by comparing its outputs with that
for a variety of existing, well-established whole
system models and their cost estimates for the
UK.55
. EconA: The economic appraisal (EconA) appraisal
technique (for full details see Trutnevyte et al.55), is
an accounting model that systematically calculate
and compare investment and total system costs for
power generation, transmission and distribution
under the three UK transition pathways. The key
inputs are the ranges of component technology
costs, eﬃciencies and other technical characteris-
tics. The quantitative output is disaggregated into
shares of diﬀerent power generation technologies,
thereby allowing the assessment of economic feasi-
bility of any given pathway (such as the CC path-
way in the contribution of Trutnevyte et al.55).
. BLUE-MLP: This model (behaviour lifestyles and
uncertainty energy model with multi-level perspective
on transitions) is a probabilistic systems dynamics
simulation model (for full details see Trutnevyte
et al.55). Its key inputs derive from sector- and
actor-speciﬁc behavioural elements55 that arise
from the MLP transitions approach17,20 (see
again the schema depicted in Figure 1), and include
the macro-landscape pressures landscape (including
government decisions or developments in the inter-
national context), the social-technical regime (e.g.
the current UK power system structure and its
regulation), and niche innovations (e.g. lifestyle-
inﬂuenced changes in demand). Its key outputs
are technology and demand change uncertainty
ranges for future energy and emissions pathways.
. EEA: The tool designated as energy and environ-
mental appraisal (EEA) is an accounting frame-
work based on the environmental life-cycle
assessment (LCA) of the UK power system (for
full details see Hammond et al.57 and see section
‘Whole systems energy and environmental apprai-
sal of the diﬀerent energy mixes’ below). Based on
a broad inputs set of technology-speciﬁc emissions
factors,26,58 the key outputs are 18 environmental
impact categories57 that are evaluated from cradle-
to-gate, accounting for both upstream and oper-
ational (or stack) emissions. The categories
included climate change (via GHG emissions),
fossil fuel depletion, human toxicity, particulate
matter formation and agricultural land use change.
. HESA/UKþ: This optimisation model is an
enhanced version of the hybrid energy system ana-
lysis (HESA) tool (for full details see Barnacle
et al.27). The model cost-optimises the UK electri-
city network, based on the energy hub concept,
using key inputs of national power demand and
generation mixes as input assumptions/parameters.
The principal output is spatial disaggregation of
generation, storage, transmission and distribution
in terms of 17 onshore nodes, ﬁve oﬀshore zones
and 39 connections.
. HAPSO: The holistic approach to power system
optimisation (HAPSO) model is a bottom-up,
cost-minimisation power system model (for full
details see Strbac et al.59), with key inputs of tech-
nology costs and characteristics as well as electri-
city system topology. The model’s key output is the
optimal power generation, storage, transmission,
and distribution network infrastructure require-
ments, as well as their associated cost. The model
then simultaneously estimates long-term invest-
ment requirements and short-term operational
decisions, including in regard to hourly dispatch,
demand side response (DSR; whereby customers
are ﬁnancially incentivised to lower, or shift, their
electricity use in order to reduce demand at peak
times), storage cycles and power interconnection.
These models and appraisals yield a broad spec-
trum of cross-scales insights55 covering system bound-
aries, time, space, and disciplines (see Figure 7). They
were found to reveal a rather fragile nature of the
transition pathway narrative descriptions or story-
lines.55 The CC pathway storyline was found, for
example, to imply an overestimation of the potential
for power demand reduction and for the uptake of
marine renewables. The necessity for CCS to meet
the 2050 UK GHG emissions target was likewise
overestimated. However, they were found to down-
play the challenge of supply-demand balancing and
the need to use gas power plants as a back-up cap-
acity, as well as the role of nuclear power and electri-
city interconnectors with Europe.
These and other ﬁndings have beneﬁted from a
whole systems and collaborative working aimed at
elaborating and examining pathways for realising a
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transition to a low carbon, secure and aﬀordable UK
energy system by 2050. Thus,
. A critical review of quantitative models for explor-
ing socio-technical transitions has aided interdis-
ciplinary learning between the diﬀerent developers
and users of the storylines, models and appraisal
tools.8,24,26–28,55–58
. The iterative improvement of the qualitative narra-
tive descriptions for the pathways, combined with
that for a diverse range of models and appraisal
techniques, is likely to be a key element in the
robust development of future transition pathways
and energy scenarios.55
Annual demand modelling
The Demand model28,55 assembles trends for the over-
all annual demand for electricity and fuels to 2050.
The model builds from bottom-up representations of
the energy service demands in the major sectors, the
performance of existing buildings and end-use equip-
ment, and the prospects for technological improve-
ments and behaviour changes. Heating technologies
in the domestic, service and commercial sectors are
modelled in detail; industrial process heat is repre-
sented through underlying sub-sector demands and
expected trends. Data were drawn initially from the
Energy Consumption in the United Kingdom
(ECUK)60 database with further disaggregation by
end-use and service employing assumptions about
future technical change developed based on multiple
sources.28 The trends for electriﬁcation of transport
are modelled, linked to work within the project.61
Assumptions were compared to those in the DECC
2050 Calculator.52
Introducing the spatial dimension to demand, the
HESA model26,27 utilises network theory to calculate
ﬂows, the energy hub concept to represent the conver-
sion of energy between carriers (i.e. generation,
including renewable energy sources), and determinis-
tic least-cost optimisation (of fuel, generation, trans-
port). The UKþ model includes physical descriptors
of all generators, energy demands and storage require-
ments. It contains the 17 UK onshore nodes, as well
as having nodes representing ﬁve oﬀshore zones
(Norway, Belgium, Netherlands, France and the UK
Continental Shelf (UKCS)). The model contains mul-
tiple carrier transportation networks to/from inter-
national nodes (39 connections facilitate the
transportation of electricity, gas, coal, oil, biomass
and CO2) with demand and supply capability to rep-
resent international nodes (thereby facilitating inter-
national trade in energy carriers). HESA and UKþ
have been used in combination to model an integrated
multi-energy carrier network and applied to local,
regional and national scale case studies in the context
of the transition pathways, e.g. combined gas and
electricity bulk ﬂows with constraints across the
United Kingdom.
This combination of models55 indicates a temporal
mismatch between low-carbon supply and demand
may lead to very low utilisation factors of dispatchable
generation, i.e. power plants that can be turned on, oﬀ,
or have their output varied in a relatively short time at
the request of the network operator or plant owner.
This aﬀects ﬁnancing of gas-ﬁred power stations, as
well as hampering the prospects for CCS. Supply-
demand balancing leads to increasing curtailment of
renewables and additional fossil fuel use, illustrates
the potential for electricity storage, but suggests that
innovation would be required for longer term storage.
This combination of models has also been employed
for stress testing, optimisation and uncertainty analysis
of the pathways. Diﬀerent technology mixes were
found to drive diﬀerent regional patterns of investment
as displayed in Figure 9. Consistently high investment
is required in the South East, South West, East of
England and in Scotland. Other regions, such as the
North East of England, were found to be exposed to
large swings in potential investment under diﬀerent
pathways. Thus, the lessons learned from annual
demand modelling were:
. An increase in capacity of the electrical North-
South corridor is essential for the success of all
three pathways. A decrease in use of the national
natural gas transmission system as a result of
decarbonisation means an under-utilisation of the
network. Total transmission and generation costs
are likely to increase out to 2050 across all three of
the UK transition pathways.
. Even in a system with greater localised energy
sources (such as under the TF pathway) there is
still a need for national energy infrastructures for
electricity and gas.
Hourly demand profile modelling
The annual demand trends are complemented by the
FESA hourly grid-balancing model26–28 (see again
Figure 8). FESA has been signiﬁcantly developed in
terms of its internal assumptions, data consistency,
the representation of demand response and energy
storage. The FESA heating demand has been disag-
gregated into hourly demand proﬁles for the domestic
and commercial sectors, and space heating separated
from water heating, with diﬀerent proﬁles taken from
industrial sources. Such proﬁles are necessary for two
main reasons, ﬁrstly in order to quantify the chal-
lenges of system balancing and to consider demand
response. The service sector and commercial organisa-
tions tend to have similar categories of energy use to
each other, and their energy uses are dominated by
services directly to people. Industries can be broadly
split into high-tech people-intensive activities and
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large, energy-intensive ones with more diverse energy
end uses.
The FESA model has been soft-linked with the D-
EXPANSE model55 so that FESA can take outputs
from the D-EXPANSE economic optimisation pro-
gram. Proﬁles for commercial and service sector
energy uses are assumed to have similar proﬁles,
being almost ﬂat during the day and early evening.
Future proﬁles of electric vehicle (EV) charging,61
domestic heat pumps62 and domestic/community
CHP include an element of speculation. Simpliﬁed
Monte Carlo modelling was used for workplace EV
charging.61
The results of this modelling indicate signiﬁcant
periods of electricity surplus under the TF pathway,
mainly due to the adoption of signiﬁcant amounts of
CHP. Smart demand side participation (DSP), includ-
ing EV batteries, water heating and space heating pro-
vide only a few hours of storage. They cannot
improve CCS capacity factors by much or allow old
gas-ﬁred plant to be decommissioned. They do, how-
ever, reduce surpluses.
Figure 8. A schematic representation of the Future Energy Scenario Analysis (FESA) model. Source: Updated from Barton et al.28
Figure 9. Spatial distribution of electricity infrastructure investments under the three UK transition pathways (2010–2050).
Note: Estimated via the HESA/UKþ combination of models.55
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Net demand or load duration curves (LDCs)
obtained via the FESA model26–28 are shown in
Figure 10 at the baseline year (2008) and under ver-
sion 2.1 of the three UK transition pathways in 2050
(see Barnacle et al.27 for the corresponding curves
associated with the previous version). It is evident
that they are steeper for all three pathways in 2050
than was the case for the UK electricity network in
2008. The MR pathway has by far the highest peak
demand at about 90 GW compared to the peak value
in 2008 of some 58 GW. This represents an extra 32
GW of generating capacity needed for only about 800
h of the year. The MR pathway also has the largest
overall range of 97 GW, down to a minimum of -7
GW net demand, which represents the most challen-
ging grid balancing requirement. The CC pathway
exhibits a ﬂatter LDC than does the MR pathway
with a lower average level of demand resulting from
a peak of only 74 GW, a minimum net demand of
about -5 GW and consequently a range of 83 GW.
Nevertheless, the top 20 GW is again only required
for 800 h, thereby reﬂecting a similar grid balancing
challenge. Finally, the TF pathway has the lowest
peak demand at around 41 GW, although in this
case the top 10 GW is only needed again for 800 h.
The minimum net demand in the TF pathway is -45
GW, giving a total range of 86 GW. Thus, the TF
pathway creates by far the biggest challenge with elec-
tricity surplus in 2050 lasting for only around 19% of
the year (with 14 TWh lost due to curtailment/
export). All the pathways result in some surplus of
low-carbon generation by the year 2050, even after
DSP – whereby customers can participate in the
energy market via smart meters and the like – has
shifted a few GW of electrical demand by a matter
of just hours: surplus power then lasts for about 14%
of the year (with around 6 TWh lost by curtailment/
export). There are several possible ways to alleviate
this temporal mismatch27: (i) by exporting electricity
via international interconnectors; (ii) making good
use of the surplus (e.g. via the replacement of boilers
and CHP by resistive heating); or (iii) dispatching
some of the low-carbon generation (particularly
wind). But conventional plants are limited in terms
of their ability to load-follow. Fossil-fuelled plants
with CCS, for example, are likely to necessitate
100% operation in order to recover their relatively
high capital cost. They are therefore unlikely candi-
dates for load-following duties. Nuclear power has a
limit to its turndown ratio, and may give rise to severe
thermal fatigue stresses when the plants are turned oﬀ
completely. Such plants are therefore generally
regarded as being non-dispatchable. The 2050
system operator will obviously need to determine
the best practical solution for network operation in
order to satisfy demanding load-following
requirements.
The temporal mismatch between low-carbon gen-
eration and demand proﬁles may lead to very low
utilisation factors of dispatchable generation. This is
likely to aﬀect ﬁnancing of gas-ﬁred power stations,
and hampers prospects for CCS, which will need to be
ﬁtted to fossil-ﬁred generation to achieve long-term
carbon budgets. The supply-demand balancing
issues will lead to increasing curtailment of renew-
ables and additional consumption of fossil fuel. This
leads to signiﬁcant potential for electricity storage,
although innovation will be needed to bring forward
options for longer term storage. Thus, overall insights
and lessons from hourly grid-balancing can therefore
be summarised as:
. One year, hourly modelling of Great Britain (GB) –
the UK less Northern Ireland – grid balancing
Figure 10. Net demand duration curves (LDCs) in 2008 and under the three UK transition pathways in 2050.
Note: Estimated via the FESA model.27,28,55
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using the FESA model indicates a temporal mis-
match of low-carbon generation against conven-
tional demand proﬁles. This presents a much
greater challenge to grid balancing than often
assumed, e.g. in the DECC 2050 Calculator.52
. Ambitious low-carbon pathways can lead to very
low utilisation factors of dispatchable generation,
including that with CCS, which could undermine
the economic viability of this innovative, disruptive
technology.
. A future system operator (in 2050 or beyond) will
need to bear in mind a number of factors in order
to secure grid-balancing27: the size of the intercon-
nector compared to the peak surplus power
requirements; the economic value of exported elec-
tricity (which may be quite low) compared to the
value of fuel saved by using more resistive heating;
and the necessity of maintaining a stable electricity
grid (in the frequency and voltage domains) in the
absence of conventional, thermal electricity
generators.
. In the absence of very large-scale long-term energy
storage, signiﬁcant curtailment of renewables and
additional consumption of fossil fuel may arise at
times.
The role and value of demand side response
Demand response is a key option for supply-demand
balancing28,59,61–65 (see Figure 11), which oﬀers bene-
ﬁts to all parts of the energy system that have been
estimated to amount to some £4 bn per year.
Electriﬁcation of heating and transport services may
provide new opportunities for DSR. For example,
research into social practices and service expectations
combined with technical modelling (see the subse-
quent section) indicate that, if householders would
tolerate a drop in indoor temperature of 1 C for up
to ten days a year, between 3 and 9 GW of peak
supply capacity could be avoided. The key aim of
DSR is therefore to explore the technical performance
of various demand response concepts via time-step
modelling techniques, but recognising the critical sen-
sitivity to input assumptions regarding the level of
expectations of the users. In order to model the poten-
tial demand response characteristics of individual
load types, data was initially collected on multiple
building loads for incorporation into the HESA/
UKþ model combination. The data were then
exchanged with the Demand and FESA models. An
integrated scheduling algorithm was devised as an
extension and redevelopment of the FESA
model26–28 (see again Figure 8) to allow demand
response to compete on a level ﬁeld against storage
and controllable generation. The main calculations
were translated into the VBA (i.e. visual basic for
applications) code for greater visibility and future
ﬂexibility. It has been recognised that changes in the
supplier/consumer relationship and in service expect-
ations of consumers will inevitably impact on energy
demand out to 2050 and beyond. Consequently, it is
important to at least qualitatively ‘model’ consumer
practices (see again the subsequent section) and to
explore the relationships among customers, suppliers
and consumers/prosumers. (Energy prosumers (see
Figure 12) are those that produce (via distributed
energy resources (DERs)), consume, manage or
trade energy according to their own requirements
and aspirations.) Smart DSP28 can help to meet the
Figure 11. The challenge of demand side response (DSR): the Thousand Flowers (TF) pathway in Spring 2050 [12 days mostly surplus,
10 days of deficit, 2 days surplus].
Note: Estimated via the FESA model.27,28,55
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challenges of ﬂexible demand. Thus, water heating has
been found to be capable of time-shifting (see again
Figure 11) by around 50% for up to 7 h, space heat-
ing by 100% for up to 1 h, and EVs and plug-in
hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) charging by 100%
for up to 7 h.
The penetration of renewable generation, particu-
larly onshore and oﬀshore wind turbine arrays, in the
UK energy mix may reach as much as 15% by 2020.
By that time the number of EVs in use may have
reached over one million. Thus, the UK power
system will be aﬀected by an increasing imbalance,
due to this rise in electricity demand (from EVs) and
uncontrolled supply (from wind). Smart EV charging
strategies61 can therefore help the power system cope
with high penetrations of local renewable energy
sources (RES). Huang and Inﬁeld61 recognised that
domestic vehicles are typically parked for around
95% of the time, and hence EVs can be utilised as a
ready form of responsive demand. They adopted a
Monte Carlo model together with state-of-charge
(SOC) information, as part of a whole systems frame-
work, in order to estimate EV charging proﬁles. Wind
farm data was taken from operational sites in
Scotland. It was found that the cost over several
small EV charging events was essentially free, pro-
vided that the surplus wind was greater than 1 MW.
Likewise, the impact of the widespread adoption of
high-performance heat pumps, alongside the large-
scale penetration of wind generators, was recently stu-
died by Cooper et al.62 They devised a model using
dynamic simulations of individual (air-sourced) heat
pumps and dwellings, which indicated that increases
in peak net-demand is highly sensitive to assumptions
regarding the heat pumps themselves, their installa-
tion, building fabric (i.e. thermal insulation)
performance and grid characteristics. If 80% of dwell-
ings in the United Kingdom were to adopt such heat
pumps, for example, then peak net-demand could rise
by around 100% (54 GW), although this increase
could fall to just 30% (16 GW) under favourable con-
ditions.62 Smart DSP could reduce this further to
20%, or even 15% with extensive use of thermal stor-
age (as depicted in Figure 11). In contrast, should
60% of dwellings take up heat pumps, then the rise
in peak net-demand could be as low as 5.5 GW, and
consequently the electriﬁcation of heating would be
more manageable for the network.62
Another study by Teng et al.63 examined the
demand for ancillary services under a future GB elec-
tricity system as a result of the high penetration of
wind generators with limited inertia capability.
Under these circumstances, the network may be
required to deal with sudden frequency drops follow-
ing a loss of generator. An advanced stochastic gen-
eration scheduling model was employed to quantify
the frequency response requirements and the contri-
bution that could be made by DSR.63 It suggested
that the provision of frequency response from DSR
could greatly reduce the system operation cost and
wind curtailment. These DSR beneﬁts were found to
have signiﬁcant diurnal and seasonal variation,
whereas an even more rapid (near-instant) delivery
of frequency response from DSR could yield substan-
tial additional value. Competing technologies to DSR
that can provide frequency regulation, such as bat-
tery storage41 or more ﬂexible conventional gener-
ation could potentially reduce its value by between
15% and 35%.63 This would still leave signiﬁcant
room to deploy DSR as a cost-eﬃcient frequency
response provider within a future low-carbon electri-
city system.
Figure 12. Structural opportunities to control flexible demand, including an illustration of the roles of the transmission network
operator (TNO), distribution network operator (DNO), and flexible prosumers.
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It is critical to reﬂect how investors will take deci-
sions to invest in (or to retire) generation plant within
a market and policy context. Accounting for the
incentives provided to companies through the trading
arrangements is hence fundamental for modelling
how investors take decisions going forward. As well
as power market revenues, renewable and low-carbon
generators are also reliant on subsidies to ensure their
proﬁtability, which is important for the investment
decision-making process. Investors will form ‘rational
expectations’ regarding the future when making
investment decisions, taking into account power
market conditions (e.g. electricity prices, demand
growth, demand ﬂexibility, changes in trading and
regulatory arrangements, etc.) over the life of the
asset based on all the information available to them
at the time. Quantitative modelling studies have there-
fore been conducted in order to evaluate the competi-
tiveness of demand response against other
technologies, using a range of GB network case stu-
dies related to the transition pathways. A holistic
approach (via the whole-electricity system investment
model (WeSIM)64; a successor to the HAPSO
model55) has been employed to assess the beneﬁts of
demand responses on power generation, transmission
and distribution systems under each of the three path-
ways scenarios (see Figure 13). WeSIM, employed by
Pudjianto et al.,64 is an enhanced model with respect
to the modelling of demand and has more functional-
ities. It was used to provide useful insights on the
characteristics of diﬀerent pathways in terms of the
expected increase in future peak demand, driven pri-
marily by electriﬁcation of heating and transport sec-
tors,61,62 as well as the consequences for future power
system infrastructure requirements. This approach64
simultaneously optimised investment into new
generation, network and storage capacity, while mini-
mising system operation cost, and also considering
reserve and security requirements. The analysis distin-
guished between bulk and distributed storage applica-
tions, while also considering the competition against
other technologies, such as ﬂexible generation, inter-
connection and DSR64 (see again Figure 13). The
results demonstrated that the DSR savings are poten-
tially signiﬁcant and that the MR pathway, for exam-
ple, could save up to £90 bn of investment by 2050. A
key issue arising from these studies is that the postu-
lated generation capacity under the pathways may not
be suﬃcient to meet security standards. This high-
lights the importance of considering the security of
supply aspect in the development of future generation
portfolios. Analysis of the electricity price character-
istics of the three pathways showed that some gener-
ators with relatively very low load factors bring into
question the feasibility of generation in an energy-
only market. There are signiﬁcant multi-stream sav-
ings that arise from DSR (multiple applications,
including energy arbitrage, system balancing and cap-
acity) across all pathways (amounting to some £4 bn/
year by 2050). The beneﬁts of whole-system based
DSR applications are higher than those of the (non-
coordinated) transmission network operator (TNO)
or distribution network operator (DNO)-centric
DSR applications: see again Figure 12. This highlights
the need for such whole system control co-ordination
between the TNO and DNO in order to improve the
interaction with DSR control.
Energy storage (ES) represents one of the key
enabling technologies to facilitate an eﬃcient system
integration of intermittent RES in conjunction with
the electriﬁcation of heating and transport demand
(see Figure 11). A stochastic optimisation method
Figure 13. Annual versus peak electricity demand under the three UK transition pathways. Note: Estimated via WeSIM64; a successor
to the HAPSO model.55
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was used to quantify the beneﬁt of distributed energy
storage from the owner perspective.65 A large set of
case studies were carried out65 in order to quantify the
commercial and emissions beneﬁts of ES in respect to
energy and ancillary service markets, the revenue
obtained from feed-in tariﬀs (FiTs), and the conse-
quent reduction in operational CO2 emissions. ES
was found to be able to provide opportunities for
temporal arbitrage, because of the volatility of day-
ahead and real-time (balancing) energy prices with a
value of between £100/kWh and £650/kWh.65 Its
value in terms of anciliary services, such as frequency
response, was estimated to be up to about £200/kWh
on top of the basic value of ES. The value of ES for
FiT revenue maximisation was found to decrease with
increasing capacity from £108/kWh to £38/kWh.65
When ES is charged during low-emission periods
and discharged in high-emission ones, then the
carbon footprint falls by around 10% even with
losses taken into account. Teng et al.65 observed
that current and near-term batteries did not appear
to be cost-eﬀective for power generation applications.
Thus, they noted that LIBs were most eﬀective
(£480/kWh) for kW/kWh applications with reason-
able charge/discharge cycle lives.41 (The cost of LIBs
are today about £140/kWh (similar to the price in
2012 noted by Hammond and Hazeldine40 of £135/
kWh) having fallen from >£1675/kWh in 1990.) This
contrasts with sodium-nickel chloride devices (so-
called ZEBRA41,65 batteries) at £329/kWh. Teng
et al.65 expect the costs of lithium ion batteries to
halve by 2020, although they expect those for the
ZEBRA battery technologies to remain largely
unchanged.
The technical performance and social acceptability
of a range of proposed DSR concepts has been exam-
ined via an integrated approach in order to quantify
the changes in electricity load proﬁles of the type rep-
resented in Figure 11. The beneﬁts of DSR options to
the various classes of consumers were quantiﬁed for a
range of scenarios appropriate to the diﬀerent transi-
tion pathways. McKenna and Thomson66 examined,
for example, the way in which domestic consumers
with rooftop solar PV arrays could beneﬁt ﬁnancially
from time-shifting. They used an internet discussion
forum to determine whether consumers with such PV
systems engage in DSR activities so that they beneﬁt
further from free, self-produced electricity. Washing
machines, dishwashers and electric space and water
heaters were the most commonly employed appliances
to shift demand.66 The results suggest that, while price
is an eﬀective driver of DSR, there are other factors
that generate demand response of the sort depicted in
Figure 11. They indicate that consumers with PV are
often willing to be more ﬂexible than is commonly
assumed. This behavioural response could possibly
be used in future to devise innovative tariﬀs
that might stimulate demand shifting.68 These value
assessments are important elements in assessing the
take-up, scale and eﬀectiveness of DSR that can be
expected.
These and other ﬁndings have beneﬁted from a
whole systems and collaborative working approach
for elaborating and examining the transition path-
ways for realising a low carbon, secure and aﬀordable
UK energy system by 2050. Thus, the insights and
lessons learned from studying the role and value of
DSR were:
. Demand side participation (DSP) concepts are
mainly short term (minutes to hours), whereas
ﬂexibility is needed over several days or more.
The rigid patterns of modern living and consumer
expectations based on life-long experience of fossil-
fuelled supplies make such ﬂexibility challenging,
but are important to explore. Fully automated
DSR concepts, such as ‘smart’ controllers for EV
charging and heat-pumps, have been studied in
some detail.
. Battery energy storage and controlled EV charging
helps cut peak demands, but typically provides
only a few hours of storage, doing little to address
longer term weather-related variations. A Monte
Carlo model of EV movements and home based
charging61 has been used to analyse the impact
on a typical low voltage distribution network
with typical household loads, suggests voltage
impacts to be the most critical: voltages could
easily become unacceptable without demand side
management. The extension of EV charging to
allow workplace charging seems to relieve the dis-
tribution network loads and help avoid voltages
outside the statutory range.
. Decarbonised electriﬁcation of heating could make
a useful contribution to the reduction in UK CO2
emissions, but may cause a challenging increase in
peak power demand, net of non-dispatchable gen-
eration. This can be reduced, although not entirely
eliminated by thermal energy storage and DSP. In
addition, it has been shown62 that high-perfor-
mance (air-sourced) heat pumps, with appropriate
installation and better insulated buildings, could
make the rise in peak net-demand far more
manageable.
. An integrated market model (developed in
WeSIM64) has been used to analyse the evolution
in electricity prices in diﬀerent system backgrounds
with diﬀerent DSR technologies, network develop-
ment, carbon prices and energy policies (related to
market integration with the EU). When viewed in
the context of a high share of renewable generation
(such as under the TF pathway), the magnitude
and volatility of electricity prices tend to increase,
particularly driven by higher carbon prices and
greater variable generation. The price diﬀerential
between exporting and importing regions also
widens from increased congestion in the national/
cross-border transmission system.
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. There are signiﬁcant multi-stream savings from
DSR (via multiple applications, including energy
arbitrage, system balancing, capacity) across all
pathways; amounting to £4bn/year by 2050.
These beneﬁts of whole-system based DSR appli-
cations are higher than those of (non-coordinated)
transmission system operator (TSO) or distribution
system operator (DSO)-centric DSR applications.
This highlights the importance of whole system
control co-ordination.
. The transition pathways have been costed under
very diﬀerent governance and institutional
arrangements. Economic feasibility of generation
in all three pathways will depend on the revenue
from secondary markets/sources, such as capacity
(ancillary service) market, FiT, tax incentives, etc.,
although the ratio of the revenue needed from pri-
mary and secondary markets is case speciﬁc.
Attending to the social dimensions of
realising transition pathways
There is growing awareness that meeting the chal-
lenges of a low-carbon transition will require socio-
technical solutions, and that consequently the social
sciences have a key role to play in devising them,
including working with engineers and physical scien-
tists in an interdisciplinary manner.66–68 A team of
social scientists worked work interactively in collab-
oration with engineers in the present consortium to
enhance consideration of the social dimensions of
the project. This included work to open up assump-
tions about actor dynamics and social change as well
as roles of the public and civil society in realising the
UK transitions pathways.66–68
Building on the concept of the action-space devised
in the ﬁrst phase of the Transition Pathways pro-
ject8,24,30 (see section ‘Insights from historical transi-
tions’ above), a relational co-productionist approach
grounded in ideas form science and technology studies
(STS) was developed to map relations between social
actors across the UK electricity system and the spaces
through which they participate in energy system
change was developed to described the way in which
diﬀerent patterns of interaction between market, gov-
ernment and civil society actors lead to particular
modes and logics of governance.8,24,30 An important
means of mapping actors and action spaces was
through a systematic qualitative analysis of twelve
contrasting visions of the low-carbon transition.
This analysis showed that while some visions assume
a technologically focused transition driven by the
energy trilemma and centred on economic growth,
alternative visions (particularly those from of civil
society actors) place more emphasis on social and cul-
tural change, issues of equity and fairness, and do not
assume or depend on existing models of economic
growth. Chilvers and Longhurst67 studied four diverse
sites of civil society engagement in low carbon transi-
tions: the DECC Energy 2050 Public Dialogue (DECC
2050), the Camp for Climate Action (CCA; direct
action events at various coal-ﬁred power stations
over 2006–2011), the Visible Energy Trial8,33 (VET)
and the Dyﬁ Solar Club (DSC; a community energy
initiative in Machynlleth, Powys, Wales). They
revealed that powerful forms of enrolment, exclusion
and the partiality of visions and actions are common
to all form of participation in transitions. Such ana-
lyses play a valuable role in transition pathways ana-
lyses through revealing social dimensions and
informing how modelling studies frame the energy
problem, bound the study system, and communicate
uncertainties. It helped the wider consortium and
technical analysts realise that that transitions are
never smooth and will always be subject to contest-
ation, negotiation and social change.
The other way in which social dimensions of energy
transitions were attended to during the second phase
of the realising transitions pathways project was
through taking forward novel interdisciplinary (ID)
experiments to co-produce social science and engineer-
ing insights on energy demand response in real time.
These studies included a meta-review of social science
evidence, leading into the design of small-scale integra-
tion experiments. The ﬁrst of the ID experiments was a
Service expectation experiment (see Figure 14, and the
summary in Table 3) in which the social science input
into existing models was evaluated in order to improve
model assumptions about how indoor comfort expect-
ations could change over time. Such service expect-
ations are often held to be stable, but social science
literature suggests they vary in diﬀerent ways. A
range of service expectation scenarios were studied
based on the outcomes from the review (such as
more demanding standards, wider comfort zone and
local diversity). The FESA model26–28 (Figure 8) was
employed in order to examine various behavioural
scenarios with variable service expectations. The
work indicated that if householders (consumers or
ﬂexible prosumers; see Figure 12) were tolerant of a
small internal temperature change either side of their
desired set-point, and even allowing these for just a few
hours per year this could yield large reductions in peak
demands (a fewGW): see again Figure 11. This opened
up the prospect of new behavioural scenarios for
models, new parameters and boundaries. The term
framing, used in Table 3, implies the inevitable process
of selective inﬂuence over the perception of an individ-
ual (involved in the experiment) in such a way as to
encourage particular (potentially biased) interpret-
ations and to discourage others. This experiment sug-
gested that new levels of detail are required in existing
FESA-like models (e.g. around heating/cooling tech-
nologies, housing stock, etc.).26–28
The second strain of social science-led, ID experi-
ment (by Higginson et al.68), termed Modelling prac-
tices experiment (and again summarised in Table 3),
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was designed to develop new approaches to modelling
based on social science understandings of, and data
about, social practices. It encouraged the social scien-
tists to communicate their ideas more clearly, whilst
allowing engineers to think critically about the
embedded assumptions in their models in relation to
society and social change. Social practice theory
together with network analysis68 was adopted to pro-
vide a network diagram to visualise diﬀerent prac-
tices. ID participants then collaboratively generate
mappings of ecologies of practices: see Figure 15
that illustrates various social activities and practices
in the home. The elements of practices – represented
by circles – are distinguished in terms of images, skills
(e.g. washing) and stuﬀ (e.g. dirty clothes). Thus,
washing clothes as an energy service is not merely
determined by the washing machine, tumble drier
and iron, but depends on much else. These other
social factors include the meaning of clean, the way
the diﬀerent schedules in the household come
together, the organisation of laundry and the way it
is done in the household, and so on, i.e. the images
and skills that are part of the practice of laundry.
Graphs of practice networks such as this can be popu-
lated with empirical survey data. Higginson et al.68
recently used this approach to examine from a
survey of diﬀerent types (or variants) of laundry prac-
tice. They gleaned insights into energy intensity, ﬂexi-
bility and the rootedness of practices, i.e. the extent to
which they were entrenched or established. It was
argued that this permitted the social practices to be
represented graphically using a quantitative format
(Figure 15) without being overly reductive. This
modelling practices experiment opened up new
socio-technical discussions about core/periphery
elements, variants of practice and so on, but also
closes down discussion about the situatedness of prac-
tices (see Table 3).
Through these ID experiments engineers had
become more aware and reﬂective of the tacit social
Figure 14. Diagrammatic representation of experiments in interdisciplinarity (ID). DR: demand response.
Table 3. Comparative reflections on interdisciplinary (ID) experiments around energy modelling and demand response.
Service expectations experiment Modelling practices experiment
Framing  Engineering/model led  Social science led
 Technical framing of energy system/demand  Social-technical framing of energy system/demand
 Social assumption tacit not explicit  Social dimensions made explicit through practice
theory lens
Process  Separated, but not connected activities  Collaborative, interactive activities
 Communicate at a distance  Communicate in person and at a distance
Products  Substantive model (FESA) results pertaining to
the whole system
 Understanding dynamics of practice in particular
settings
 Future research needs identified  Development of approaches as a basis for further
research
 Social diversity and variability not represented
by the model
 Whole systems implications are less clear
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assumptions and limitation of their models, while
social scientists became more aware of the complexity
of energy models and the diﬃculty of making even
small changes to their inbuilt assumptions.
Importantly, these collaborations produced new ﬁnd-
ings and insights only possible through interdisciplin-
ary working. Bringing together practice theory with
network analysis extended and scaled up understand-
ings of energy-related practices, generating new
insights on the constraints and potentials for model-
ling ﬂexibility and energy demand response. In the
service expectation experiment, integrating social sci-
ence insights into the FESA model showed how even
small changes in thermal comfort expectations can
lead to signiﬁcant savings in terms of energy
demand, which could prove crucial in realising low
carbon transitions.
Key challenges, insights and opportunities identi-
ﬁed in these studies attending to the social dimensions
of energy transition pathways include:
. New evidence that quantitative energy modelling
approaches routinely neglect important social
aspects of energy transitions and how society will
inﬂuence future pathways, including changes in
how energy problems are framed, service expect-
ations of users, the roles of public engagement
and institutional changes.
. Social science analyses can provide important new
evidence about the relations between actors and
forms of participation in energy transitions,
which is important evidence in its own right and
in sensitising models to alternative framings, social
futures and uncertainites inherent to scenarios and
model projections.
. If interdisciplinary collaboration is well designed,
open, collaborative and based on trust it is possible
to integrate engineering and social science expert-
ise, which produces new insights beyond what is
possible with single-discipline approaches – for
example, showing prospects for energy demand
ﬂexibility and responsiveness greater than previ-
ously estimated.
. There is no single best practice approach to inter-
disciplinary energy research. An eﬀective approach
is to develop forms of integration between social
science and engineering modeling approaches that
are appropriate, diverse and can be evaluated and
learned from over time.
. Involving social scientists in real-time interdiscip-
linary collaboration with physical scientists can
hold the key to producing whole systems energy
models that are more responsible, anticipatory
and accountable to the social implications and
eﬀects of energy transition pathways.
Distributed energy
The TF pathway explores a low-carbon transition led
by civil society, which focuses on decentralised or dis-
tributed solutions to energy problems. Currently, less
Figure 15. A simplified network representation linking social activities and practices in the home: identifying ‘hubs’, ‘anchors’ and
‘clusters’.
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than 1% of UK electricity demand is met by commu-
nity- or local authority-owned distributed electricity
generation. A major driver for the TF pathway is seen
to be a step change in the role of the civic energy
sector (communities, co-operatives, local authorities,
town and parish councils, social housing providers)
through participation in, and ownership of, electricity
generation schemes. ESCos are presumed to emerge,
with incentives aligned with energy eﬃciency improve-
ments. Because this pathway deviates most from the
current energy market, and has no recent precedent, it
has interested bodies including the public-private ETI
(e.g. their Patchwork scenario) and the UK energy
market regulator (Ofgem). The consortium post-
graduate researchers (the Engine Room (see section
‘From narrative descriptions of the transition path-
ways to model formulation’ above); again working
independently of the consortium leadership – the aca-
demic co-investigators) were asked to evaluate the
implications of this novel pathway, and they produced
a Distributing Power report.69 With strong demand
reduction and management, 50% of 2050 ﬁnal electri-
city usage could be met via distributed generation
with emerging technologies, new infrastructures
(including interconnections), and new institutions.
Although challenging to the current power system
operational norms, a transition to 50% distributed
generation by 2050 was found to be technologically
feasible. However, it would require the installation
and full utilisation of smart grid technology, alongside
DSP, demand management, and other techniques and
technologies. A more distributed system would clearly
need regional energy strategies and local capacity
building for city regions, municipalities, communities
and citizens. A distributed energy system opens up
new avenues for energy transition ﬁnance, while chal-
lenging incumbent utility business models. (The inte-
grated market simulation model (WeSIM64),
described in section ‘Hourly demand proﬁle model-
ling’ above, can be used to optimise real-time dispatch
in a chronological fashion, as well as reﬂecting entry
and exit decisions by investors, using an iterative pro-
cess.) The model for investment in conventional and
renewable generation was used to calculate the elec-
tricity prices (including energy and scarcity prices that
reﬂect the scarcity in generation capacity during peak
demand), generation and transmission revenues. It
highlighted the ﬁnding that electricity prices are
expected to be more volatile in the future and that
the impact of demand response on average electricity
price is modest but it reduces signiﬁcantly the
volatility.
The Distributing Power report69 draws on empirical
research, engagement with a wide range of stake-
holders from the energy sector, and from experience
in Germany, Denmark and in the United Kingdom.
It oﬀers insights into the barriers and the technological
transformation that might be required for a move to a
highly distributed energy future. This decentralised
generation would be required to satisfy the TF path-
way with an increase in regional, national and inter-
national interconnection in order to ensure electricity
imports from neighbouring countries.69 Much of the
energy value that currently leaks out of the UK econ-
omy could then be captured at the local level. Such
distributed energy systems have often been equated
with increased energy independence. But signiﬁcant
reduction in electricity demand would be necessary,
including improved energy eﬃciency and conservation.
Households, for example, would need to more than
halve current levels of electricity consumption by
2050.69 National energy planning with regional and
local support for a civic energy sector would be
needed. This implies a much greater role for national
and local government. The traditional business models
of the Big Six incumbent electricity suppliers would
inevitably be challenged as they lose market share to
local generation and supply businesses. New infrastruc-
ture, like smart grids and emerging decentralised tech-
nologies (such as in-home fuel cells), would be
necessary; requiring a large-scale expansion from
2020 onwards. The impact to consumer bills would
only be marginally more expensive out to 2030,69
although they could be signiﬁcantly cheaper in the
long term (to 2050) compared to the MR and CC
pathways. While the Distributing Power report69
assesses the impact of one distributed generation
future, there are others which might see a greater role
for solar, onshore wind, or other generation mixes.
Traditionally, renewable electricity generation cap-
acity in the United Kingdom has been built by large-
scale commercial developers and/or utilities, whose
ﬁnances are globally mobile. The Distributing Power
report69 suggests a possible alternative of a prolifer-
ation of distributed energy generators, which are
owned fully or in part by municipalities, communities,
or small-scale investors. (A companion piece to the
Distributing Power report,69 produced by Johnson
and Hall,70 has examined the distributional implica-
tions of the TF pathway.) Citizens would thereby gain
more control over their energy use. Centralised gen-
eration would still be necessary for base-load and
peaking capacity. However, for this to be viable in a
distributed generation future, the government would
need to provide the right incentives for new large-scale
plant and infrastructure. The civic energy sector,
deﬁned as energy generation by communities, co-
operatives, local authorities, town and parish councils
or social housing providers, currently relies on moti-
vated individuals and communities and often, volun-
tary work. The development of a decentralised future
along the lines proposed for the TF pathway would
require strong project management and professional
expertise to deal with a range of technical, ﬁnancial,
legal and administrative issues. In order to move to a
distributed approach, regional energy strategies and
local capacity building would be essential to aggregate
these local energy schemes into a coherent civic energy
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generation sector.69,70 This would mean complement-
ing national energy planning with regional and local
support for a civic energy sector and implies a much
greater role for both national and local government.
The launch of the Distributing Power report69 in
February 2015 informed the wider UK energy
debate, and is leading to further work with key stake-
holders, including an invited submission to the Ofgem
non-traditional business models process. The headline
messages were:69
. All UK energy projections, including a distributed
energy future (such as that encapsulated in the TF
pathway), require international interconnection. In
addition, the TF pathway relies heavily on energy
demand reduction, DSP and demand-side manage-
ment. Households would need to more than halve
their current levels of electricity consumption by 2050.
. A distributed energy system opens up new avenues
for energy transition ﬁnance, while challenging
incumbent utility business models. Around 50%
of ﬁnal electricity demand by 2050 could be met
via distributed generation, but new infrastructures
and emerging technologies would be required: from
smart grids at a national level and to the likes of in-
home fuel cells locally. A large-scale expansion
would need to occur under the TF pathway from
2020 onwards. Thus, national energy planning with
regional and local support for a civic energy sector
would be needed.
. A high-level of distributed generation would
require an increase in regional, national and inter-
national interconnection, such as electricity
imports from neighbouring countries. Distributed
energy systems have often been equated with
increased energy independence. Much of the
energy value that currently leaks out of the UK
economy could be captured at the local level.
. The traditional business models of the Big Six incum-
bent electricity suppliers would be challenged as they
lose market share to local generation and supply
businesses. In order to move towards a more distrib-
uted system, regional energy strategies and local cap-
acity building would be essential for city regions,
municipalities, communities and citizens.
. The impact to consumer bills within a highly dis-
tributed power system (of the sort proposed for the
TF pathway) would only be marginally more
expensive in the medium term out to 2030,
although it could be signiﬁcantly cheaper over the
long term to 2050 in comparison to those under the
alternative MR and CC pathways.
Whole systems energy and environmental
appraisal of the different energy mixes
The energy and environmental appraisal of the three
transition pathways and associated power technologies
have been evaluated within the context of a transpar-
ent sustainability appraisal framework, i.e. economic,
social, environmental and technical beneﬁts.57,58,71
This process employed a toolkit of techniques to
explore and evaluate the whole systems consequences
of the selected transition pathways, such as the
(embodied and process) energy and carbon implica-
tions of the pathways and technology mixes, their
environmental burdens (as indicated by environmen-
tal LCA57,58,72–75), and aggregate carbon and environ-
mental footprints. A comprehensive review of the
LCA of energy systems57 included an overview of
the historic development of LCA from the early
1990s, and its subsequent codiﬁcation by the
International Standards Organization (ISO).
Environmental appraisal of energy systems needs to
be conducted on a life-cycle basis, i.e. embracing the
full range of extraction, production, distribution, and
end-of-life processes or technologies.57,58,72–75 In a full
or detailed LCA, the energy and materials used and
pollutants or wastes released into the environment as
a consequence of an activity or service are quantiﬁed
over the whole life-cycle; typically from cradle-to-
gate.57 Such studies are often geographically diverse;
i.e. the energy and material inputs associated with the
activity may be drawn from any continent or geo-
political region of the world. They involve four
main LCA stages that follow a logical sequence of
goal deﬁnition and scoping, inventory analysis,
impact assessment, and interpretation. The current
strengths and weaknesses of LCA have been identiﬁed
for the beneﬁt of energy practitioners and policy ana-
lysts57 (see Table 4). Comparisons were made with
related approaches, such as carbon and environmen-
tal footprinting.71
An examination of the whole system environmental
burdens of the present transition pathways (version
2.1) was undertaken by Hammond and O’Grady58
(as an extension of the earlier LCA study by
Hammond et al.75 (of version 1.1 of the pathways)),
whereby GHG emissions reﬂected the sum of both
upstream and operational emissions. The latter
(‘stack’) emissions are those directly associated with
the combustion of fossil fuels within power stations.
Thus, the whole system emissions amount to those
related to the ‘cradle-to-gate’. The national electricity
network (operated by TNOs and DNOs) represents
the downstream boundary known as the gate (hence,
cradle-to-gate75). In the studies by Hammond et al.75
and Hammond and O’Grady,58 they highlighted the
signiﬁcance of upstream emissions and their (techno-
logical and policy) implications, in contrast to the
emphasis on power plant operational emissions con-
ventionally presented by other analysts. These
upstream environmental impacts arise from the
energy requirements for extraction, processing/reﬁn-
ing, transport and fabrication, as well as methane
leakages from coal mining activities – a major contri-
bution – and natural gas pipelines. The total carbon
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dioxide equivalent (CO2e) emissions associated with
various power generators and UK electricity transi-
tion pathways towards a low carbon future are
depicted in Figure 16. This illustrates the GHG tra-
jectory under each of the three transition pathways
out to 2050. It was also found that CO2e capture facil-
ities coupled to fossil-fuelled plants deliver only a
70% reduction in GHG emissions (including both
upstream and operational emissions), in contrast to
the normal presumption of a 90% saving.
The transition pathways LCA study by Hammond
et al.75 yielded estimates of pollutants or wastes
released into the environment as a consequence of
the UK ESI in terms of 18 separate impact indicators
(together with a tentative single score, aggregate LCA
measure). The lower the resulting score for each cat-
egory (or the single score indicator) the better,
although they doesn’t adequately reﬂect, for example,
the impacts associated with nuclear power generation.
Nuclear is low carbon, but has a number of other
health and environmental impacts associated with
the potential release of ionising radiation from
nuclear power stations and processing plants. These
are generally not eﬀectively accounted for in LCA
software tools,75 because they do not have an under-
lying basis in ecotoxicology. Statistical weighting of
the diﬀerent LCA categories is normally achieved by
the engagement of a panel of experts. It is therefore
highly subjective, and this process would not be advis-
able in many cases. Clearly, it is diﬃcult to manage
something like 18 diﬀerent impact categories, and
consequently it is necessary to focus on key categories.
Large impacts were found in terms of categories such
as Human Toxicity, Freshwater Eutrophication,
Marine Ecotoxicity and Natural Land
Transformation75 particularly under the MR pathway.
Carbon emissions are the currency of debate in a cli-
mate-constrained world,4,58 and consequently GHG
emissions are typically given greater emphasis. There
is likely to be a signiﬁcant fall in carbon emissions
from the UK power generation sector (see Figure
16) of some 31–51% by 2020, 65–86% by 2030 and
78–93% in 2050.58 The lower ﬁgures relate to the MR
pathway, whilst the higher ones are associated with
the TF pathway. Notwithstanding the emphasis on
GHG emissions, some of the other environmental
burdens may need to be monitored.
The British Government’s independent Committee
on Climate Change (CCC) has advocated deep cuts in
power sector operational emissions through the
2020s,46 with UK electricity generation being largely
decarbonised by 2030–2040. In contrast, the present
transition pathways projections (see again Figure 16)58
indicate that the UK ESI could not be fully decarbo-
nised by 2050 on the whole systems basis employed in
the process-LCA studies.58,75 This is because the pre-
sent estimates take account of upstream, fugitive
GHG emissions, whereas the projections by bodies
like the CCC and Department of Energy and Climate
Change (DECC) generally do not. Nevertheless, the
transition pathways suggest that the ESI will be able to
bear a signiﬁcant share of the overall 80% carbon
reduction target by 2050. The CCC analysis indicates
that average operational emissions from the power
generation sector would fall to around 50 gCO2/
kWhe by 2030.46 In contrast, the present MR path-
way (Figure 16) indicates that whole system emissions
from the UK ESI are likely to only fall, accounting
for upstream emissions, to 202 gCO2e/kWhe by 2030
and 105 gCO2e/kWhe by 2050.58 The least impactful
pathway (TF) suggests58 that GHG emissions will fall
to only 108 gCO2e/kWhe by 2030 and 53 gCO2e/
kWhe by 2050 (Figure 16). If the United Kingdom is
to genuinely meet its legally-binding carbon reduction
targets, then it will be necessary to account for
upstream emissions from power generation.58,75
Otherwise, even if the current UK carbon reduction
targets are met, there will remain further emissions
upstream.
An alternative way of evaluating the environmental
impacts of the three UK transition pathways is via
carbon and environmental footprinting.4,71
Environmental or ecological footprints have been
widely used in recent years as indicators of resource
consumption and waste absorption associated trans-
formed on the basis of biologically productive land
area (in global hectares (gha)) required per functional
unit (such as kWhe). They represent a partial measure
of the extent to which an activity is sustainable.4,71 In
contrast, carbon footprints are the amount of carbon
(or carbon dioxide equivalent) emissions associated
with such activities in units of mass or weight (like
kilograms per functional unit), although they can be
translated into a component of the environmental
Table 4. An outline of the strengths and weaknesses of environmental LCA.
Strengths Weaknesses
Holistic environmental appraisal Static/Snapshot assessments
Established international standards Variation in assessment due to value choice/methodological approaches
Procedural transparency Only predefined environmental impacts assessed
Allows level playing field for comparison A target for sustainable activity not specified-only embodied impacts quantified
Pinpoints environmental/inefficient hotspots Data quality
Springboard for communication Inaccessible results
Source: Hammond et al.57
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footprint (on a gha basis). In order to determine the
footprints associated with three UK transition path-
ways, the overall environmental footprint has been dis-
aggregated into various components71: bioproductive
and built land, carbon emissions, embodied energy,
materials and waste, transport, and water consumption
(see Figure 17). The total environmental footprint in
the baseline year of 2010 was found from historic data
to be 43 Mgha. In this case, the carbon and embodied
energy footprint components were responsible for 80%
to the total environmental footprint.
Future environmental footprints were estimated
for each of the three transition pathways.4,71
Electricity demand was projected to decrease signiﬁ-
cantly under the TF pathway by 2050, but its total
environmental footprint was nevertheless greater than
either that under the MR or CC pathways (see again
Figure 17). This is mainly due to the increase in the
contribution of the bioproductive and built land com-
ponent and that of the carbon footprint (rising to 10.9
and 12.5 Mgha respectively by 2050),71 which are
both seen to be higher than in either of the MR and
CC cases. Thus increase in these TF pathway compo-
nents was mainly due to increased usage of solid bio-
fuels for power generation. In order to reduce the
overall TF footprint it would therefore be necessary
to adopt other renewable power technologies, like oﬀ-
shore wind and solar PV arrays, to satisfy the increase
demands caused by electriﬁcation of heat and trans-
port. The MR and CC pathways gave rise (see again
Figure 17) to footprints of 23 and 25 Mgha respect-
ively in 2050, as compared to 43 Mgha in the 2010
base year.71 Here, the embodied energy component
was the largest amongst the various footprint compo-
nents; rising to 14 and 13 Mgha respectively by 2050.
This was due to the large-scale use of fossil-fuelled
power plants. There is a large reduction in carbon
emissions under the MR pathway (over an 86%
reduction compared to 2010 levels), whilst the CC
pathway exhibits a slightly smaller fall (albeit nearly
an 80% reduction). On the other hand, the TF path-
way displays only 42% reduction in carbon emissions
by 2050 (Figure 17). Water and waste footprint com-
ponents made almost negligible contributions under
all three transition pathways (only 1% footprint
share), although this was recognised as probably
being an artefact of the footprint methodology and
assumptions adopted.71 Bioenergy and biofuel foot-
prints and land-take (see again Table 2) reﬂect rela-
tively large environmental burdens when compared to
other fuels.
The carbon and environmental burdens associated
with the three UK transition pathways have been
assessed via environmental LCA and footprinting
methods. Overall insights and lessons from such stu-
dies can be summarised as:
. A critical state-of-the-art review of this environ-
mental LCA methodology57 has identiﬁed its cur-
rent strengths and weaknesses for energy
practitioners and policy analysts.
. The extraction and delivery of fuel requires energy
and creates GHG emissions. The upstream emis-
sions associated with various power generators and
UK electricity transition pathways have been eval-
uated on a whole systems basis. There will remain
Figure 16. ‘Whole systems’ (upstream plus operational (or ‘stack’)) GHG emissions under the three UK transition pathways (1990–2050).
GHG: greenhouse gas.
Source: Adapted from Hammond and O’Grady.58
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further emissions upstream that are unaccounted
for by the CCC and DECC. They only account
for upstream fugitive GHG emissions beyond UK
borders.58,75
. The carbon and environmental footprints of the
three UK transition pathways have also been eval-
uated.71 The overall environmental footprints were
disaggregated into: built land, carbon emissions,
embodied energy, materials and waste, transport,
and water consumption. This component-based
approach has enabled the sustainability challenges
to be assessed quite broadly, along with speciﬁc
issues (e.g. the linkages associated with the so-
called energy-land-water nexus).
Economic analysis and appraisal
Any transition pathway in the UK energy system will
require very large expenditures in the capital intensive
energy sector. The costs and potential beneﬁts of such
investments, as well as how these investments pos-
ition key market participants in relation to a range
of economic risks, are a critical element to the eco-
nomic appraisal of such pathways. Economic consid-
erations are the core consideration of market-led
actors, while the government – in its social planning
role – has a wider consideration of costs under a
multi-criteria approach, but one in which a socially
optimal transition pathway would reduce costs as far
as possible. Many analysis frameworks of possible
future energy transitions conduct only a post-calcula-
tion of costs (e.g. via the DECC 2050 Calculator or
analysis by the UK energy market regulator
(Ofgem)), whereas costs are a critical input into the
formulation and decision making process in any tran-
sition pathway.
Many existing energy modelling studies have been
criticised for their limited treatment of societal actors
and associated socio-political dynamics, together with
poor representation of the co-evolving nature of soci-
ety and technology.76 It has therefore been argued
that they consequently ﬁnd it demanding to analyse
socio-technical change. In parallel, it is evident that
some of the prominent conceptual frameworks of
socio-technical energy transitions (STET) ﬁnd it diﬃ-
cult to operationalise policy development require-
ments in quantitative energy analyses. A review and
critique of quantitative models for exploring STET
was therefore undertaken by Li et al.,76 alongside
their application to the energy supply, buildings and
transport sectors. They subsequently devised a novel
taxonomy for describing STET models76 for integrat-
ing both quantitative modelling and conceptual
socio-technical transitions, which incorporated
techno-economic detail, explicit actor heterogeneity,
and transition pathway dynamics. This study also high-
lighted a number of the challenges associated with their
theoretical and behavioural validation, and proposed
future development priorities for STET models.76
A stylised probabilistic energy system model
(BLUE-MLP) has been constructed with key behav-
ioural parameters on price and non-price drivers. The
model has been extended to incorporate alternative
actors, spatial and temporal detail. The initial version
of the BLUE model was critically reviewed and vali-
dated by embedding it in the multi-model comparison
exercise (see section ‘From narrative descriptions of
the transition pathways to model formulation’ above,
and Trutnevyte et al.55). In addition, a literature over-
view for understanding the state-of-the-art research in
behaviour and transition modelling was carried out.
Participation in the qualitative-quantitative know-
ledge integration for demand response (see the
Figure 17. Environmental footprints of the three UK transition pathways in 2050.
Source: Adapted from Hammond.71
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above section) helped to collect further ideas on
developing BLUE. The initial Excel economic apprai-
sal of the transition pathways covers electricity gener-
ation, transmission and distribution. It takes account
of the temporal and market participant elements.77
The Excel economic appraisal (EconA) was
embedded in the afore-mentioned multi-model com-
parison activity (see again section ‘From narrative
descriptions of the transition pathways to model for-
mulation’ above55) in order to validate its ﬁndings
against other realising transition pathway models.
The implications of the multi-model comparison
activity for the EconA and D-EXPANSE model
were summarised by Trutnevyte et al.55 (see both
the sections ‘From narrative descriptions of the tran-
sition pathways to model formulation’ and ‘Annual
demand modelling’ above). The D-EXPANSE
model was used to model the UK power sector tran-
sition between 1990 and 2010, in order to get insights
about the structural uncertainty of cost optimisation,
and to systematically translate the transition pathways
narratives into quantitative representations.
Clearly the costs and aﬀordability of energy tran-
sitions are one of the most inﬂuential drivers in terms
of the energy policy trilemma. But so also are the
interactions between the power sector and other key
economic sectors that drive decarbonisation in line
with climate targets. A collaborative study between
energy-economic modellers and power systems engin-
eers from the Realising Transition Pathways
Consortium therefore undertook a cost appraisal of
the UK transition to a low-carbon electricity system
under alternate governance logics.77 This novel
approach linked the quantitative electricity system
transition pathways and their economic appraisal.
Retirement of existing power plant capacity and the
installation of new build was based on either DECC
planned retirements77 or estimated lifetimes. Costs of
the transmission and distribution network infrastruc-
tures (see Figure 12) were modelled via the WeSIM64
model – a successor to the HAPSO model55,77 (see
both the sections ‘From narrative descriptions of the
transition pathways to model formulation’ and
‘Hourly demand proﬁle modelling’ above). Outside
the power system, only the costs of heat-producing
devices (such as resistive heaters and gas boilers, com-
munity-scale and micro-CHP, and heat pumps) were
included in the analysis. It focused on monetary costs
and did not account for externalities, associated with
the costs of diﬀerent impacts on the environment77
(like those considered within an LCA study, such as
that described in the above section). The results (see
Figure 18) contrast the dominant market-led MR
transition pathway with alternate pathways that
have either stronger governmental control elements
(CC pathway), or bottom-up proactive engagement
of civil society (TF pathway). The MR pathway
exhibited the lowest investment costs out to 2050,
whereas the CC pathway had slightly higher total
system costs; presuming its implied government poli-
cies could be enacted and maintained. The bottom-up,
more decentralised (TF) pathway was found to come
at the expense of higher investment costs,77 although
it encourages wider participation with civil society. It
requires signiﬁcantly higher investment in renewable
electricity generation, electric heating, and particu-
larly EV transport. The spatial distribution of invest-
ment requirements under each UK pathway was
another issue explored by the partnership of energy-
economic modellers and power systems engineers (see
Figure 18. Relative capital investment costs for the three UK transition pathways out to 2050. Source: Updated estimates based on
Trutnevyte et al.77
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Figure 9) (and section ‘From narrative descriptions of
the transition pathways to model formulation’ above).
Economic appraisal of the three UK transition path-
ways55,76,77 contributes to an understanding the future
interplay of the energy policy trilemma, i.e. achieving
deep GHG emission cuts, whilst maintaining a secure
and aﬀordable energy system. The insights and lessons
from these studies can be summarised as:
. Investment costing of the three UK transition path-
ways under very diﬀerent governance and institu-
tional arrangements was achieved via a novel
collaborative study between energy-economic mod-
ellers and power systems engineers.77 It showed
that the TF pathway gave rise to the highest invest-
ment costs, due to the need for large-scale renew-
ables (such as wind farms), electric heating, and
principally EVs and their transport/charging
infrastructure.
. From this novel STET taxonomy for integrating
both quantitative modelling and conceptual
socio-technical transitions,76 methodological
improvements in economic analysis of transition
pathways were identiﬁed as being as important as
the analytical insights from any given modelling
comparison. For example, ﬁrstly understanding
the spatial and temporal boundaries of any cost
calculation, and secondly assessing if demand
reductions are induced by policy instruments (a
welfare loss) or attributed to lifestyle evolutions
(no welfare loss) are fundamental challenges.
Stimulating investment in low-carbon
options
Analysis of historical energy transitions30–32 (see sec-
tion ‘Insights from historical transitions’ above) dem-
onstrates that rapid change is possible, but not
frequent, and requires a high degree of co-ordination
of actions, driven by recognised need to change, e.g.
the shift from Town Gas to natural gas. Potential low-
carbon investors in the United Kingdom are faced
with uncertainty about national policy priorities,
and there are structural constraints on low-carbon
investment, including immaturity of the sector and
mismatches between fund manager and renewable
energy investment timescales.80 The economic feasi-
bility of generation under all three transition pathways
will depend on revenues from secondary markets/
sources (e.g. the capacity market, FiT and various
tax incentives). However, the ratio of the revenue
needed from primary and secondary markets is case
speciﬁc. Comparison with the situation in Germany
demonstrates the valuable role that can be played by
locally focused institutions, where civic ownership is
supported by a local banking sector.83
A review of socio-technical systems research by
Bolton and Foxon78 argued that this approach can
be operationalised to assess policy and societal chal-
lenges of large-scale investments in the low-carbon
infrastructure. They observed that the United
Kingdom is moving into a new phase of energy gov-
ernance with signiﬁcant demand for new investment
to meet long-term climate policy objectives, as well as
shorter term energy security challenges. The UK
Government’s recent EMR aims to promote invest-
ment in large-scale low carbon technologies, through
incentive schemes such as the contract for diﬀerence
(CfD) and FiTs. They provide a guaranteed price for
low carbon generation and thereby remove one sig-
niﬁcant uncertainty, although policy and political
risks still remain. In further research, Bolton et al.79
interviewed a range of energy policy and industry
stakeholders, revealing diﬀerent views on governance
of energy systems. Those in favour of a liberalised
market approach thought that the government
should just set the rules, but otherwise not interfere
to address price and other risks. In contrast, the main-
stream investment community continues to be con-
cerned that other risks could prevent large-scale
investment in low-carbon generation. The Levy
Control Framework, which was put in place out to
2020 with no clarity as to if it will be extended beyond
that, has created an additional policy uncertainty for
investors. Capacity markets have been introduced in
order to ensure security of energy supply, indicating
that this has greater priority than meeting carbon
budgets (as reﬂected in recent UK Government
energy policy pronouncements). This again creates
uncertainty for investors, as experience indicates
that regulatory frameworks and incentives are liable
to change over time. In order to bring in new actors,
such as mainstream institutional investors, better
understanding of how they perceive these risks and
uncertainties is required.
A socio-technical approach has been employed78 to
this important area of policy debate in three speciﬁc
areas: understanding long-term uncertainty and
investment risks; avoiding technological lock-in; and
accelerating the diﬀusion of low carbon ﬁnance
niches. It explored the dynamics of long-term struc-
tural change in capital intensive systems (such as
energy, housing and water supply with the aim of
seeking to redirect them towards more sustainable
long-term trajectories. Bolton and Foxon78 argue
that interventions need to balance the demands of
private investors with wider social objectives.
A better understanding of investment risk and uncer-
tainty is required. Insights from the MLP of transi-
tions theory suggest that it is necessary to avoid
lock-in to current technologies, and the need to sup-
port low carbon ﬁnance niches.
In a follow-up study, Bolton et al.79 examined the
way in which actors in the UK electricity sector are
attempting to deliver investment in low-carbon tech-
nologies. Such generation capacity is relatively imma-
ture and is capital intensive, although they have low
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operational costs. Empirical research79 investigating
the agency of incumbent regime actors in the face of
uncertainty was based on interviews with 36 stake-
holders from private and civic energy companies,
mainstream and alternative investors, renewables pro-
ject developers, energy policy makers and civil society.
It was found that low-carbon generation does not
readily ﬁt into existing electricity markets and invest-
ment templates that were designed for a fossil fuel
based energy system. The ﬁndings of Bolton et al.79
can inform contemporary debates on the politics and
governance of sustainability transitions and oﬀers
critical insights on the role of markets and ﬁnance
in shaping socio-technical change. Key electricity
market and infrastructure policies in the United
Kingdom were analysed79 in order to determine
ways that low carbon technologies could be made
investable. This research argued that this could be
achieved by reducing uncertainty, better management
of investment risks, and repositioning actors within
the electricity socio-technical regime.
The role of ﬁnancial markets in capitalising low-
carbon energy systems and long-term change has been
explored.80 Capital requirements for energy system
transitions are typically very large, and yet the litera-
ture has been curiously quiet on the role of capital
markets in ﬁnancing energy transitions. Stakeholder
interviews identiﬁed that there are relatively few deals,
whilst learning and adaptation are slow. Economic
incentives, such as the CfD and FiT strike prices, or
renewable obligation certiﬁcates (ROCs), are only one
type of driver for change. This implies that providing
stable incentives may not lead to market penetration
of renewables investment. Hall et al.80 have analysed
the UK EMR process and the provision of renewable
energy ﬁnance, and argued that an adaptive market
hypothesis provides a useful framework for under-
standing the evolution of electricity markets in
response to low carbon policy incentives. They
demonstrated that the market for renewable energy
ﬁnance does not conform to the standard eﬃcient
markets hypothesis, due to structural and behavioural
constraints on investment. However, considering
ﬁnancial markets as being adaptive enables the
range of policy responses for the acquisition of low-
carbon investment to be much broader.80
Primary data collection was undertaken by Hall
and Foxon81 to characterise the importance of a
smart grid infrastructure within a UK energy transi-
tion. The UK economy and electricity system have co-
evolved, but there remains a mismatch between the
distribution of beneﬁts and costs of investing in this
infrastructure; leading to a problem of value capture
and redeployment. Some beneﬁts of smart grids are
less easy to price directly, and are more accurately
classiﬁed as public goods, such as energy security
and decarbonisation. Hall and Foxon81 drew on
semi-structured interviews and focus groups involving
UK smart grid stakeholders. This led them to identify
municipal-scale developments as potential sources for
new business models to deliver smart infrastructure.
Municipalities may thus pursue speciﬁc economic
opportunities with DNOs to make smart grid invest-
ments. This supports recent practical interest in an
expanded role for municipalities as partners and
investors in smart grid infrastructures.
Transforming energy distribution networks will
also play a key enabling role in a low-carbon energy
transition in the energy, water and mobility sectors.
But Bolton and Foxon82 have argued that there is
relatively little understanding of the social and insti-
tutional dimension of these systems, or appropriate
institutional challenges to their transformation. This
may be because the prevalent model of infrastructure
governance in the energy and other sectors has priori-
tised short-term time horizons and static eﬃciencies.
Bolton and Foxon82 therefore discuss the appropriate
governance strategies for developing ﬂexible and sus-
tainable systems of energy distribution. They draw on
ideas from the social shaping of technology in order
to develop a broader understanding of infrastructure
change as a dynamic socio-technical process. A range
of governance challenges to the development of elec-
tricity and heat networks are examined along the dif-
ferent phases of the infrastructure life cycle. Lessons
are then drawn for the development of governance
frameworks for the transformation of energy infra-
structure more widely.82 In the case of electricity dis-
tribution in Britain, the regulator (Ofgem) has sought
to design suitable incentives to overcome barriers to
long-term investment and innovation, although these
are at an early stage of implementation. UK local
authorities, by contrast, have struggled to ﬁnance
large-scale infrastructure investments in the area of
district heating (so energy-eﬃcient and popular in
the Scandinavian countries).
A comparative analysis of recent energy policy
developments in selected European countries (e.g.
the German Energiewende) and on the implications
of developments at a European level on UK energy
policy (e.g. carbon pricing and market unbundling)
has been reported by Hall et al.83 Field research on
the German situation drew out the implications for
ownership, governance and ﬁnancing of low carbon
energy infrastructure. The German system diﬀers
from UK system in at least four ways. It had a
much greater degree of decentralisation and munici-
pal ownership, following post-War reconstruction.
Their low-carbon transition or Energiewende was
seen as a national priority. More decentralised polit-
ical institutions in the German federal system enable a
greater degree of energy policy experimentation.
Finally, a more bank-based ﬁnancial system in
Germany, including a well-developed local banking
system, contrasts with the centralised and market-
based ﬁnancial system in the United Kingdom.
These local German banks have often built on local
knowledge and encouraged small-scale renewable
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investment. They became key promoters of civic and
community ownership of electricity generation assets.
Such municipal ownership might again enable a simi-
lar, more long-term perspective to be taken in the
United Kingdom, with a focus on good, safe, reliant
energy infrastructure. Further economic and social
beneﬁts might then accrue to local municipalities.
These roles of actors, governance arrangements
and regulations have been analysed in relation to rea-
lising market-led, government-led and civil society-led
low carbon transition pathways, leading to the follow-
ing ﬁndings:
. Energy systems can best be understood as socio-
technical systems made up of interacting techno-
logical and institutional elements, coevolving over
time. Governance and regulatory frameworks are
critical in managing risks for decision-makers and
investors.
. Changes to investment support for low-carbon
electricity generation have led to increasing risks
and uncertainties, and concerns that long-term
governmental commitment to decarbonisation
may be undermined if the salience of energy secur-
ity and cost priorities grows.
. Analyses of energy ﬁnance as an adaptive market80
help identify the lack of a mature community of
investors, mismatches between investment and
fund manager timescales, and lack of suitable
investment vehicles. Capital markets are likely to
change over the long-term to yield more adaptive
markets for energy ﬁnance.
. The economic feasibility of generation in all three
pathways will depend on the revenue from second-
ary markets/sources, such as the capacity (ancillary
service) market, FiT, and various tax incentives,
although the ratio of the revenue needed from pri-
mary and secondary markets is case speciﬁc.
. A comparative UK–Germany analysis83 has shown
the importance of the local banking sector in facil-
itating civic ownership structures there.
. The possibility of a low-carbon, decentralised tran-
sition (like that envisaged under the TF pathway)
driven by civic energy systems has highlighted the
role of local banking systems, and of shared values
(including public service and local economic
development).83
Concluding remarks
The British Government has set a legally binding
target of reducing the nation’s CO2 emissions by
80% by 2050 in comparison to a 1990 baseline.6
This would ideally require the UK ESI to be decarbo-
nised by around 2030–2050 in order to give more head
room for carbon mitigation in other, more challenging
sectors (such as industry and transport).46 A set of
three low-carbon transition pathways were developed
and analysed via an innovative collaboration between
engineers, social scientists and policy analysts. The
pathways focus on the power sector, including the
potential for increasing use of low-carbon electricity
for heating and transport, within the context of crit-
ical European Union developments and policies. Their
development started from narrative storylines regard-
ing diﬀerent governance framings, drawing on inter-
views and workshops with stakeholders and analysis
of historical analogies. The quantiﬁed UK pathways
were named Market Rules (MR), Central Co-ordina-
tion (CC) and Thousand Flowers (TF); each represent-
ing a dominant logic of governance arrangements –
recently described by the Chief Executive Oﬃcer of a
prominent UK renewable electricity supplier and gen-
erator company (unconnected with the project) as
reﬂecting blue, red and green pathways respectively.
These pathways have been used to explore what is
needed to realise a transition that successfully
addresses the so-called energy policy trilemma, i.e.
the simultaneous delivery of low carbon, secure and
aﬀordable energy services. Such energy transitions are
never smooth and always subject to contestation,
negotiation and social change. The UK ESI has
already undergone quite rapid change over the last
few years.84 Coal power station closures, for example,
have amounted to 15 GW between 2010 and 2015;
with combined cycle gas turbine plant closures
accounting for a further 4 GW. In contrast, there
has been a rapid rise in solar PV systems that now
stands at around 853,000 installations, for which roof-
top solar alone now accounts for >1% of UK electri-
city supply.84 The recent British Government energy
policy reset, the components of which will only
become clear during 2017 (although some senior
executives in the UK power sector speculate that it
will propose roughly 30% nuclear, 30% renewables,
and 30% gas) will lead to additional changes going
forward. Thus, if the three transition pathways were
being developed today they would no doubt contain
rather diﬀerent energy mixes. The TF pathway might
contain more solar PV, but less bioenergy, for
instance. Nevertheless, the insights gained from this
exercise still provide a valuable evidence base for
developers, policy makers and other stakeholders.
A fundamental requirement for identifying and
addressing the multiple challenges and opportunities
posed by energy policy and climate change necessi-
tates a combination of academic knowledge with
that from industry, commerce, regulatory bodies, pol-
itical and societal communities. This ambitious goal
appears to be more achievable in processes that com-
bine the analytic (the systematic application of expert
knowledge) with the ‘deliberative’ (the systematic
application of opportunities for face-to-face discus-
sions between experts, stakeholders and citizens).85,86
The ‘Realising Transition Pathways’ Consortium has
adopted the practice of the co-production of know-
ledge to explore and integrate diﬀerent kinds of
34 Proc IMechE Part A: J Power and energy 0(0)
expertise in order to provide opportunities for reﬂec-
tion and evaluation. It has attempted to achieve a
level of joint working that allows the eﬀective sharing
of disciplinary-speciﬁc and professional expertise.
New evidence and case studies of UK energy transi-
tions provide practical advice on how sustainable
energy transitions will depend on science and policy
institutions becoming more responsive and adaptive
to distributed societal actions. Here the challenges,
insights and opportunities that have been gleaned
from this research are highlighted (via bullet point
summaries at the end of each principal section above).
Analytical tools were developed and applied to
assess the technical feasibility, social acceptability,
and environmental and economic impacts of the path-
ways. Technological and behavioural developments
were examined, alongside appropriate governance
structures and regulations for these low-carbon tran-
sition pathways, as well as the roles of key energy
system actors (both large and small). An assessment
of the part that could possibly be played by future
demand responses was also undertaken in order to
understand the factors that drive energy demand
and energy-using behaviour. A set of interacting and
complementary engineering and techno-economic
models or tools were then employed to analyse elec-
tricity network infrastructure investment and oper-
ational decisions to assist market design and subsidy
mechanisms. This provided a basis for integrating the
analysis within a whole systems framework of electri-
city system development, together with the evaluation
of future economic beneﬁts, costs and uncertainties.
Likewise, the energy and environmental performance
of the diﬀerent energy mixes were appraised on a life-
cycle basis to determine the GHG emissions and other
ecological or health burdens associated with each of
the three transition pathways. The UK Carbon
Budgets46 are presently on track for an 80% reduction
(in production emissions) by 2050, although it has
been observed here58 that the impact of upstream
(and consumption) GHG emissions are generally
excluded. The impact of such upstream emissions on
the carbon performance of technologies (such as com-
bined heat and power (CHP) and CCS) and the tran-
sition pathways themselves58 distinguish the present
ﬁndings from those of other analysts, such as the
CCC and DECC. None of the three pathways yield
zero GHG emissions by 2050, which suggests that the
UK electricity sector cannot realistically be decarbo-
nised by 2030–2040 as advocated by the CCC.46
Socio-technical solutions are required on both the
demand and supply-side of any future UK energy
system. Reduction in energy demand for heat,
power and transport will be a signiﬁcant element of
any energy strategy aimed at limiting global warming
to <2 C under whatever pathways actually results
out to mid-century.87,88 Improvements in energy eﬃ-
ciency can be obtained from better thermal insulation
of the building fabric, smart appliances and controls,
alongside the adoption of eﬃcient heating systems,
such as heat pumps, community energy schemes and
the like. In addition, lifestyle or workplace changes,
DSR and DSP may well be needed, but these will be
partially oﬀset by so-called rebound eﬀects.
Decarbonising the supply-side is likely to see the con-
tinued adoption of new nuclear build (although the
whole system costs may be prohibitive), oﬀshore wind,
and rooftop solar PV. It will inevitably need the take-
up of CCS (as well as carbon capture and utilisation
(CCU)) for a cost-eﬃcient transition, together with
sustainable bioenergy and biofuels, and possibly
hydrogen (H2) as a fuel and energy storage media in
the long term. Unfortunately, there are constraints
over the use of bioenergy resources, including uncer-
tainties over the availability of UK sustainably-
sourced biomass, land use challenges, and competi-
tion with food supply. Finally, the energy infrastruc-
ture in Britain will need renewal in order to make it
more resilient (e.g. to climate change impacts) and to
potentially accommodate greater decentralised or dis-
tributed generation, including greater use of both
large and small energy storage devices. Signiﬁcant
generation, transmission and distribution network
reinforcements (operating with much lower utilisation
factors) will be needed to meet future changes in
demand and generation patterns. However, smart
power innovations (a combination of interconnectors,
storage and demand ﬂexibility (or DSR)) could gen-
erate £8 bn per year of savings (according to a report
for the recently-established UK National
Infrastructure Commission89; for which a member of
the Realising Transition Pathways Consortium
(Goran Strbac and his team) played a key role90).
Indeed, in a risk assessment study of the UK power
sector, Hammond and Waldron11 found that lack of
investment in new infrastructure to be ranked the
second highest risk to the power sector by diﬀerent
stakeholder groups (academic researchers, civil ser-
vants, electricity companies, green groups, power
system engineers and various others). The electricity
grid was found to be arguably the most vulnerable
part of the power system; reinforcing the case for
UK network renewal and reconﬁguration by the
middle of the 21st century.4,11 Innovation, systems
integration, and whole systems thinking to identify
sustainable energy options (sometimes termed option-
ality in industry), as examined in the present study,
will therefore be critically important in the transition
towards a low-carbon future.
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